

Oil Market Report

14 April 2026

- Oil demand is expected to contract by 80 kb/d this year, as the Iran war upends our global outlook. This is 730 kb/d less than in last month's *Report* and a forecast 1.5 mb/d 2Q26 decline would be the sharpest since Covid-19 slashed fuel consumption. Initially, the deepest cuts in oil use have come in the Middle East and Asia Pacific, mainly for naphtha, LPG and jet fuel. However, demand destruction will spread as scarcity and higher prices persist.
- Global oil supply plummeted by 10.1 mb/d to 97 mb/d in March, with continued attacks on energy infrastructure in the Middle East and ongoing restrictions to tanker movements through the Strait of Hormuz leading to the largest disruption in history. OPEC+ production fell 9.4 mb/d m-o-m to 42.4 mb/d while non-OPEC+ supply declined 770 kb/d m-o-m to 54.7 mb/d, as lower Qatari output offset gains in Brazil and the United States.
- Global crude throughputs continue to struggle with disruptions to feedstock supplies and infrastructure damage that are tightening global product markets. In April, Middle East and feedstock-constrained refineries in Asia have cut runs by around 6 mb/d, to 77.2 mb/d. Global crude runs are now expected to decline by 1 mb/d on average in 2026, to 82.9 mb/d. Refining margins temporarily surged as middle distillate cracks reached all-time highs.
- Global observed oil inventories fell by 85 mb in March, with stocks outside of the Middle East Gulf drawn down by a significant 205 mb (-6.6 mb/d) as flows through the Strait of Hormuz were choked off. At the same time, with limited outlets after the effective closure of the Strait, floating storage of crude and oil products in the Middle East rose by 100 mb and onshore crude stocks in the region were up by 20 mb. China added 40 mb of crude to tanks.
- Oil prices posted their largest-ever monthly gain in March in the wake of the most severe oil supply shock in history. Spot crude benchmarks and differentials soared, outpacing futures markets, as refiners anxiously scrambled to replace locked in Middle Eastern cargoes. At the time of writing, North Sea Dated crude was trading around \$130/bbl – \$60/bbl above pre-conflict levels.

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Disruptions mount

The announcement last week of a two-week ceasefire in the conflict in the Middle East provided some welcome respite to global oil markets just as the impact of disruptions to supply and trade were spreading globally. However, at the time of writing, it remains unclear whether the ceasefire will turn into a lasting peace and a return to regular shipping flows through the Strait of Hormuz. With oil-importing nations scrambling to source replacement barrels from an increasingly shrinking pool of supply, physical crude oil prices surged to record levels near \$150/bbl, far above the prices in futures markets, with the physical-futures disconnect becoming increasingly acute. Even steeper gains have been seen for refined products, with middle distillate prices in Singapore reaching all-time highs above \$290/bbl.

Resuming flows through the Strait of Hormuz remains the single most important variable in easing the pressure on energy supplies, prices and the global economy. The latest development in the fast-evolving situation is the announced US blockade on vessels entering or departing Iranian ports and coastal areas, which was due to go into effect soon after the time of writing. In early April, shipments through the Strait remained severely restricted, with loadings of crude, natural gas liquids and refined products averaging around 3.8 mb/d, compared with more than 20 mb/d in February ahead of the crisis. Exports through alternative routes – most notably from the west coast of Saudi Arabia and Fujairah on the east coast of the UAE, as well as the ITP pipeline that runs from Iraq to Ceyhan in Türkiye – had increased to 7.2 mb/d from less than 4 mb/d before the war. The overall loss in oil exports exceeds 13 mb/d, with associated production curtailment and damage to energy infrastructure in the region resulting in cumulative supply losses of more than 360 mb in March and 440 mb projected for April.

Consumers and refiners alike are tapping into oil inventories to mitigate the immediate impact of supply disruptions. In March, global observed oil stocks fell by 85 mb despite an accumulation of both on-land and offshore inventories in the Middle East and further builds in China. The largest decline came from oil on water following the near halt to sailings from Gulf producers dependent on the Strait. Crude oil stocks in importing countries in Asia dropped by 31 mb, with further declines expected in April.


Where oil inventories could not bridge the gap, demand has taken a hit. Most notably, Asian petrochemical producers have curtailed operating rates as feedstock supply dried up. Households and businesses using LPG have also been impacted, while flight cancellations across the Middle East, parts of Asia and Europe have led to a sharp drop in jet fuel consumption. A growing number of countries have implemented policies to reduce demand, while others have put in place measures to shield consumers from the full impact of rising fuel prices. Overall, global oil demand is estimated to contract by 800 kb/d year-on-year in March and by 2.3 mb/d in April. Global oil demand is now projected to decline by 80 kb/d on average in 2026, compared to growth of 730 kb/d expected in last month's *Report*.

The prospects for a lasting negotiated settlement to the conflict remain unclear at this stage. In this *Report*, we present a forecast that assumes a resumption of regular deliveries of oil and gas from the Middle East to international markets by mid-year, although not back to pre-conflict levels. We recognise that this scenario could prove too optimistic, considering the high degree of uncertainty over how the situation may develop. We also present an alternative case where risks to energy production and trade in the Middle East remain high due to a prolonged conflict (see *Strait Down – Stocks Draw as the Loss of Hormuz Flows Tightens Balances*). In this case, energy markets and economies around the world need to brace for significant disruptions in the months to come.

Strait Down – Stocks Draw as the Loss of Hormuz Flows Tightens Balances

The outlook for global oil market balances has rarely been as uncertain. Disruptions to oil supply and trade from the Middle East war continue, aggravating crude and product shortages and pushing prices to levels that are undermining demand. It remains to be seen whether the two-week ceasefire announced on 7 April can be a stepping stone to a more lasting settlement. The future of the Strait of Hormuz appears to be a sticking point. Iran stated it would allow “safe passage” through the Strait during the ceasefire period “via coordination with Iran’s armed forces”. This was rejected by the United States, which in turn imposed a blockade on all vessels entering or departing Iranian ports and coastal areas after high-level negotiations held in Pakistan ended without an agreement on 11 April. At the time of writing, neither the United States nor Iran had closed the door on further talks, with a week left in the ceasefire agreement, but flows through the Strait remain constrained.

While many questions remain over the pace of an eventual recovery of flows, this *Report* assumes, in our “base case”, that oil shipments will gradually resume from May, allowing a recovery in oil production and refinery activity through 3Q26. In this case, our balances show oil market deficits returning to a surplus that averages 2.5 mb/d in 2H26. The cumulative supply deficit peaks in June before correcting almost linearly by year end with the recovery in supply. The total build in 2026 averages just 300 kb/d across crude, products and NGLs versus a surplus of 2.4 mb/d projected in last month’s *Report*.




In our “protracted case”, disruptions to Middle East energy production and trade remain high, and energy flows to international markets remain largely restricted. This will cause deficits in the oil balance to persist, with the resulting price rise and economic impact pushing oil demand into a large year-on-year contraction. The price and economic effects of this scenario, plus already announced demand reduction measures, reduce demand by 5 mb/d y-o-y on average from 2Q26 through 4Q26. The remaining shortfall in supply lifts the global call on stocks to an untenable 6 mb/d, or almost 2 billion barrels in aggregate losses by year end. This suggests further deliberate demand reduction efforts will rapidly be required to balance the market and avoid even deeper economic damage.

With the geopolitical situation still in flux and the prospects for a lasting negotiated settlement to the conflict still unclear, our two cases span the range of probable outcomes. A middle case where flows see a gradual but only partial resumption before end-2026 may also be considered.

Demand

Overview

The Iran war has thoroughly upended the global outlook for oil consumption, with worldwide demand now expected to move into contraction instead of growth. Demand is forecast to decline by 80 kb/d y-o-y in 2026, with a 150 kb/d expansion in the non-OECD outweighed by a 240 kb/d decrease in the OECD. This is 730 kb/d less than our estimate in last month's *Report*, with OECD and non-OECD accounting for 200 kb/d and 530 kb/d, respectively, of the downward revision.



The war's impact triggered a sudden plunge in global oil deliveries in March of 800 kb/d y-o-y, with further negative momentum building in April to -2.3 mb/d – the biggest monthly fall since the start of 2021. The pace of decline will subside in our base case forecast after supplies chains start to normalise from May and as an improving macroeconomic outlook and falling oil prices combine to incentivise demand thereafter. Accordingly, a decline of 1.5 mb/d y-o-y in 2Q26 is projected to improve to growth of 70 kb/d in 3Q26 and 610 kb/d in 4Q26.

Global Demand by Product

(thousand barrels per day)

	Demand				Annual Chg (kb/d)		Annual Chg (%)	
	2019	2024	2025	2026	2025	2026	2025	2026
LPG & Ethane	13 211	14 875	15 164	15 109	290	- 55	1.9	-0.4
Naphtha	6 690	7 204	7 215	7 209	12	- 7	0.2	-0.1
Motor Gasoline	26 928	27 504	27 842	27 834	338	- 8	1.2	0.0
Jet Fuel & Kerosene	7 865	7 531	7 760	7 830	229	70	3.0	0.9
Gas/Diesel Oil	28 747	28 879	29 143	29 129	264	- 15	0.9	-0.1
Residual Fuel Oil	6 207	6 454	6 260	6 233	- 194	- 26	-3.0	-0.4
Other Products	11 110	11 046	10 959	10 916	- 88	- 43	-0.8	-0.4
Total Products	100 759	103 493	104 343	104 259	851	- 84	0.8	-0.1

Within the product complex, petrochemical feedstocks display the most immediate effects of the war by far, as the blockage of the Strait of Hormuz has thrown supply chains to Asia into disarray. LPG/ethane and naphtha account for the bulk of April's drop, down by 1.8 mb/d. Compared to 8% and 9% y-o-y declines in the two feedstocks, decreases in transport fuels are comparatively modest, with gasoil, gasoline and jet/kerosene's contracting by around 1% each in April. Still, despite severe

disruptions to Middle Eastern air traffic and elevated product cracks, jet/kerosene will be the only product to post an annual 2026 expansion (+60 kb/d, y-o-y), with gasoil, gasoline, LPG/ethane and naphtha contracting by between 10 kb/d and 50 kb/d apiece.

In addition to the war's immediate impact, soaring oil prices function as the main driver of demand destruction, especially in the OECD where the pass-through into retail fuel prices is already well advanced. This is complemented by a more subdued economic outlook, with 2026 global GDP growth of 3% assumed in our balances, down from 3.4% last month.


As the war weighs especially on Asian and Middle Eastern oil use, this somewhat levels the usual disparity between OECD and non-OECD. The OECD Americas, Europe and Asia Oceania will see declines of around 80 kb/d each in 2026, with expansions of around 100 kb/d in non-OECD regions such as Africa, Latin America and Asia, excluding China. On a country level, China (+80 kb/d y-o-y) and India (+130 kb/d) are expected to retain their status as mainstays of global oil consumption growth. The major outlier within the non-OECD is the Middle East, with its annual demand contraction (-250 kb/d) the largest of any region.

Global Demand by Region								
(thousand barrels per day)								
	Demand				Annual Chg (kb/d)		Annual Chg (%)	
	2019	2024	2025	2026	2025	2026	2025	2026
Africa	4 181	4 546	4 745	4 830	199	86	4.4	1.8
Americas	31 572	31 700	32 008	32 000	308	- 8	1.0	0.0
Asia/Pacific	36 274	38 905	39 270	39 411	366	141	0.9	0.4
Europe	15 119	14 305	14 265	14 225	- 41	- 40	-0.3	-0.3
Eurasia	4 663	4 815	4 833	4 824	18	- 10	0.4	-0.2
Middle East	8 950	9 222	9 222	8 968	0	- 254	0.0	-2.8
<i>OECD</i>	<i>47 548</i>	<i>45 897</i>	<i>45 890</i>	<i>45 654</i>	<i>- 8</i>	<i>- 236</i>	<i>0.0</i>	<i>-0.5</i>
<i>Non-OECD</i>	<i>53 211</i>	<i>57 595</i>	<i>58 454</i>	<i>58 605</i>	<i>858</i>	<i>152</i>	<i>1.5</i>	<i>0.3</i>
World	100 759	103 493	104 343	104 259	851	- 84	0.8	-0.1

Petrochemicals at the Centre of Demand Destruction

Naphtha, LPG and ethane have seen the clearest demand destruction of any products as a result of the war in the Middle East. Global 2Q26 demand for the products is now estimated 1.5 mb/d lower than in our February *Report*. This rapid response is because the petrochemical sector is comprised of a relatively small number of large, price-sensitive players, who are generally highly exposed to global markets and international trade. The most severe impacts have been seen in the Middle East and Asia, but ripple effects will spread to producers across all regions.

Middle Eastern petrochemical production, which is largely export-focused, has been hit hard by a combination of the loss of feedstock owing to upstream shutdowns, damage to plants and dislocation from overseas markets. Where Gulf plants are still intact and supplied with feedstock, we have assumed



that they will continue running, albeit at reduced rates, while accumulating additional stocks of polymer. However, there are various examples of the loss of feedstock supply or direct damage to plants, as in the case of the UAE's sprawling Borouge steam cracker complex at Ruwais and Qatar's Ras Laffan Olefins Company. Local feedstock demand has been downgraded by an estimated 780 kb/d in 2Q26, with the outlook for the remainder of the year dependent on the extent of damage to petrochemical and upstream equipment and the ease of re-establishing export routes.

The loss of major feedstock import flows has triggered surging costs and widespread run cuts, reportedly equivalent to between 10% and 30% of capacity, for petrochemical plants across Asia. These have impacted steam crackers, aromatics plants and propane dehydrogenation, with naphtha demand down by 450 kb/d and LPG/ethane reduced by 320 kb/d compared to pre-war estimates. The cuts are spread across all major production centres, including China, and were already apparent in reported March data for India. Naphtha demand dropped by 14% while LPG/ethane consumption, primarily used in relatively inelastic domestic and commercial markets, fell by 12.5%.

The combination of lower Asian production and reduced Middle Eastern exports is already stretching polymer inventories thin in some markets, threatening difficulties for the manufacturing, textiles, construction and packaging sectors. Producers in the United States, where NGL-derived feedstocks are in surplus, may be able to opportunistically raise prices, rates and exports. Similarly, European crackers may be more competitive while feedstock availability remains sufficient.

In China, chemical processes that use coal as a feedstock have seen a major improvement in margins since February. Plants that convert coal to polyethylene and polypropylene (via methanol) are believed to have been running at high operating rates since last year's tariff turmoil. However, there may be limited scope to further increase the output of these plastics as well as polyvinyl chloride (PVC) and polyester precursor ethylene glycol.


OECD

OECD oil consumption is forecast to decline by 240 kb/d y-o-y in 2026. This marks a 200 kb/d downward revision from last month's *Report*, as soaring oil prices and a harsher economic outlook result in a substantially more adverse trajectory. The negative contribution from rising wholesale oil prices is especially pertinent for advanced economies, as these tend to have a much firmer and faster transmission into retail prices than emerging markets, where price controls are prevalent. This linkage with market oil prices is particularly strong for the United States, which accordingly accounts for more than half of the total OECD downgrade. OECD Europe and OECD Asia Oceania see smaller revisions. In the latter region, naphtha accounts for almost half of the adjustment, as disrupted supplies from the Gulf deprive Asia's petrochemical industry of its feedstocks.

Oil demand in the **United States** is set to decline by 60 kb/d y-o-y in 2026. Gasoline (-100 kb/d) and gasoil (-50 kb/d) represent the lion's share of the drop. Amid stagnant demand elsewhere in the product mix, this leaves LPG/ethane (+110 kb/d) as the only material driver of expansion.

This represents a 110 kb/d downgrade from last month's *Report*, as a weaker economic outlook (2026 GDP growth of 2.4% underlies our models, down from the 2.8% assumed last month) and much higher fuel prices combine to decimate oil demand growth. The negative contribution from rising oil prices is particularly pronounced, as the United States has the most direct and complete pass-through of market prices into retail prices among developed economies. Since hostilities began, gasoline and diesel prices are up by 31% and 41% through early April, respectively,


according to data from *GlobalPetrolPrices*. Some limited relief will come from the US administration's ruling to waive environmental restrictions to reduce air pollution on summer-blend gasoline and to allow the ongoing sale of gasoline blended with 15% ethanol during the season.



Official and preliminary reported deliveries were reasonably firm in the first quarter of 2026. US oil consumption posted a minor contraction of 80 kb/d y-o-y in January as increases in LPG/ethane (+230 kb/d) and naphtha (+60 kb/d) were outweighed by stagnation or decreases elsewhere – especially in gasoline (-220 kb/d). However, preliminary delivery data for February and March subsequently indicated a return to expansion of around 300 kb/d on average. Once again, LPG/ethane led gains, accounting for around one-third of the total increase.

Macro data readings were already pointing to slowing economic activity before the start of the Iran war. Fourth-quarter US GDP growth was revised down sharply in March from 1.4% to an annualised rate of 0.7%. As consumer spending and business investment slowed, weighed down by the 1 October-12 November government shutdown, this represented a significant deceleration from 3Q25's stellar 4.4% rate. Labour market data were mixed, with the US economy losing 92 000 jobs in February but regaining 178 000 in March. Higher-frequency sentiment indicators have begun to reflect the impact of the war in Iran, with rising pump prices and falling stock markets depressing consumer morale. The University of Michigan's Consumer Sentiment Index dropped by 3.3 points m-o-m to 53.3 in March – only marginally above all-time lows.


Meanwhile, inflation remains stubbornly elevated, rekindling stagflation concerns. Headline personal consumption expenditures (PCE) inflation was 2.8% y-o-y in January and has now exceeded its 2% target for five years. The Federal Reserve kept interest rates unchanged in a range between 3.5% and 3.75%, as chair Powell stated that the central bank will not cut rates until inflation resumes its decline. Financial markets are pricing higher inflation in the medium term, with the yield on ten-year Treasury notes climbing above 4.4% in March, from below 4% before hostilities began.



Underlining the harsher macro outlook, gasoil's average demand contraction of -1.3% in 2026 is the largest among the products, narrowly exceeding gasoline's (-1.2%). Intensifying cost pressures have begun to squeeze manufacturers, retailers and farmers, with US spring planting currently underway. Freight and manufacturing readings were mostly firm in the run-up to the conflict but have started to slip. The American Trucking Associations (ATA)'s advanced seasonally adjusted For-Hire Truck Tonnage Index increased by 2.1% y-o-y in February, its largest gain since October 2022. Also, the headline Institute for Supply Management's (ISM) Manufacturing PMI surprised to the upside, rising by 0.3 m-o-m to 52.7 in March, the highest level in nearly four years. However, slower deliveries, which typically point to demand outpacing supply, may be due to lengthening supply chains. Besides falling inventories and rising input costs, the impact of the war is visible in the falling new orders subindex (-2.5 to 53.5).

Reported **Canadian** data were firm in January at +80 kb/d y-o-y, and 150 kb/d above last month's estimate. As in the United States, this was entirely due to strength in LPG/ethane (+110 kb/d). On an annual basis, the strong start to the year is outweighed by higher oil prices and a bleaker economic outlook, resulting in flat demand in 2026. We see a 10 kb/d decrease for **Mexico** in 2026 – however, in the absence of reported delivery data since early 2025, this is a modelled estimate.

Oil demand in **OECD Europe** is projected to decline by 50 kb/d y-o-y in 2026, down 20 kb/d from last month's *Report*, with only gasoline (+60 kb/d) in significant expansion. The decrease is broad-based across countries, with France, Italy and the United Kingdom contracting by around 20 kb/d each and German demand essentially flat. January delivery data were essentially flat (+30 kb/d y-o-y), as weakness in naphtha (-140 kb/d) was offset by moderate expansion in the other products. Support came from cold temperatures that boosted oil use for heating, with average heating degree days in Germany, France and Italy about 10% above last year and their five-year average. However, demand growth is set to shift into negative territory from February, with the impact of higher pump prices set to fully materialise in April (-410 kb/d y-o-y), followed by a slower pace of decline in the remainder of the year.



With the region's economic outlook overshadowed by the Middle East conflict, key indicators have begun to display the unfavourable combination of lower activity and higher inflation. Germany's ZEW Economic Sentiment Index collapsed into negative territory – from 58.3 in February to -0.5 in March – posting the biggest decline since February 2022 when the war in Ukraine started. Germany's Ifo Institute downgraded its 2026 GDP growth forecast by 0.2% to 0.8% due to the war, while raising its inflation outlook, estimating it could peak at around 3% if oil prices remain at current levels for an extended period.

In this context, soaring pump prices, with additional upward pressure from the weaker EUR/USD exchange rate, have begun to squeeze consumers, with diesel prices rising to all-time highs in March in Germany, the Netherlands and France. Major European countries have introduced a range of measures to blunt the impact of rising energy prices on households, ranging from lower excise duties and VAT (Italy, Spain) to industrial and household subsidies (France, Spain, United Kingdom), and retail fuel price caps (France, Spain). The measures' detrimental implications for public finances have spooked bond markets, already worried by rising inflation and the prospect of a hawkish turn in central bank policy – bond traders expect the European Central Bank to raise interest rates by around 0.75% in total in 2026. Accordingly, European sovereign bond yields climbed to multi-year highs in March.

We have reduced our estimate for 2026 oil demand growth for **OECD Asia Oceania** by 70 kb/d to -110 kb/d, with roughly equal downgrades in Japan and Korea of -30 kb/d each. This downward revision occurs largely in naphtha, as the blockage of exports through the Strait of Hormuz upends feedstock supplies to Asia's petrochemical industry.

Japanese oil demand is set to decrease by 60 kb/d in 2026, with all major products posting contractions. This represents a 30 kb/d downward revision from last month's *Report* and results in a similar rate of decline to last year's -70 kb/d, as the Takaichi's government expansionary fiscal policy and fuel subsidies dampens the worst effects of the oil shock. Japan's gasoline prices briefly rose to all-time highs of 191 yen/litre mid-March, before reverting towards 170 yen/litre after the government reinstated 800 billion yen (\$5 billion) in subsidies to oil wholesalers to ease the impact of rising prices.

Korea's reported deliveries of 2.5 mb/d in February showed a minor y-o-y contraction of 40 kb/d. However, demand growth is set to plunge deeper into negative territory due to lower uptake of LPG/ethane and naphtha, as the closure of the Strait of Hormuz deprives Korea's giant petrochemical industry of feedstocks. We have reduced aggregate demand growth for the two fuels between March and May by an average of 140 kb/d from last month's estimate.

More generally, Korea's economy has so far remained resilient in the face of the economic turmoil, buoyed by booming semiconductor export shipments, which exceeded \$30 billion for the first time in March. Moreover, the country rolled out a 26.2 trillion won (\$17 billion) extra budget to cushion the impact of the oil shock. Also, President Lee Jae Myung launched a campaign encouraging Koreans to actively participate in energy-saving activities in their daily lives. We see a 30 kb/d y-o-y demand decline in 2026, almost entirely in naphtha, amid flat consumption in the rest of the product spectrum.

OECD Demand based on Adjusted Preliminary Submissions - February 2026																
(million barrels per day)																
	Gasoline		Jet/Kerosene		Diesel		Other Gasoil		LPG/Ethane		RFO		Other		Total Products	
	mb/d	% pa	mb/d	% pa	mb/d	% pa	mb/d	% pa	mb/d	% pa	mb/d	% pa	mb/d	% pa	mb/d	% pa
OECD Americas	10.36	0.6	1.92	3.9	3.53	-0.1	1.88	-2.4	4.82	1.9	0.46	3.7	2.31	4.0	25.28	1.1
US*	8.77	0.7	1.62	2.7	2.69	0.0	1.54	-2.4	3.91	1.6	0.35	0.3	1.71	7.6	20.59	1.2
Canada	0.79	2.3	0.17	23.2	0.29	0.2	0.32	-2.1	0.54	5.6	0.02	128.8	0.35	-7.8	2.47	2.2
Mexico	0.71	-3.0	0.10	0.0	0.37	-1.3	0.02	-4.7	0.33	0.0	0.08	-2.4	0.22	0.0	1.81	-1.6
OECD Europe	2.29	2.5	1.38	2.4	4.61	-2.8	1.21	2.1	1.16	6.7	0.59	-11.1	1.93	-5.2	13.18	-0.9
Germany	0.50	1.5	0.15	-2.3	0.62	-5.1	0.28	-0.4	0.09	-1.8	0.05	-17.4	0.34	5.2	2.02	-1.2
United Kingdom	0.34	-0.7	0.33	-0.1	0.55	-1.2	0.05	6.1	0.10	-3.0	0.01	3.0	0.09	1.5	1.47	-0.5
France	0.27	2.8	0.16	4.9	0.63	-3.1	0.10	-17.9	0.09	-8.3	0.03	-6.1	0.18	-7.5	1.46	-3.4
Italy	0.20	7.8	0.09	2.7	0.47	-2.8	0.05	3.5	0.13	2.7	0.03	-22.9	0.16	-21.5	1.14	-3.8
Spain	0.15	3.0	0.14	0.7	0.45	-1.9	0.21	17.3	0.09	40.2	0.12	-17.9	0.19	-6.2	1.35	1.0
OECD Asia & Oceania	1.39	0.5	1.09	-3.2	1.41	-1.9	0.44	2.5	0.79	0.4	0.39	0.7	1.85	-4.5	7.37	-1.7
Japan	0.72	-2.3	0.63	-5.7	0.45	0.1	0.30	-3.3	0.44	-0.1	0.17	-4.1	0.63	-5.6	3.35	-3.2
Korea	0.27	6.0	0.23	0.5	0.32	-10.4	0.08	37.5	0.29	1.6	0.18	2.7	1.08	-4.2	2.46	-1.5
Australia	0.28	1.3	0.17	-0.1	0.57	1.9	-	-	0.04	2.6	0.02	-2.5	0.10	-1.9	1.17	1.0
OECD Total	14.04	0.9	4.39	1.6	9.55	-1.7	3.53	-0.3	6.77	2.5	1.44	-3.7	6.10	-1.7	45.83	0.1

* Including US territories.

Non-OECD

Oil demand in key non-OECD regions is being sharply undermined by the continuing impacts of the conflict in the Gulf. We expect average 2026 demand to grow by 150 kb/d y-o-y, down by 530 kb/d from last month's *Report*. Despite extensive disruptions, these balances assume that demand in emerging Asia, Africa and Latin America will continue to increase but this will be partially offset by a 250 kb/d decline in Middle Eastern deliveries. We estimate that non-OECD demand will fall by an average of 1.3 mb/d y-o-y during March, April and May.

Non-OECD: Demand by Product								
(thousand barrels per day)								
	Demand				Annual Chg (kb/d)		Annual Chg (%)	
	2019	2024	2025	2026	2025	2026	2025	2026
LPG & Ethane	7 689	8 674	8 872	8 653	198	- 218	2.3%	-2.5%
Naphtha	3 402	4 257	4 358	4 422	101	64	2.4%	1.5%
Motor Gasoline	12 308	13 250	13 520	13 579	270	59	2.0%	0.4%
Jet Fuel & Kerosene	3 357	3 181	3 283	3 341	102	58	3.2%	1.8%
Gas/Diesel Oil	15 057	15 841	16 121	16 307	280	186	1.8%	1.2%
Residual Fuel Oil	4 408	4 953	4 843	4 823	- 110	- 21	-2.2%	-0.4%
Other Products	6 990	7 438	7 457	7 479	19	23	0.3%	0.3%
Total Products	53 211	57 595	58 454	58 605	858	152	1.5%	0.3%

The most acute impacts have been felt in LPG and ethane deliveries, owing to the large-scale consumption of NGL-derived feedstocks in petrochemical plants, which would usually export via the Strait of Hormuz, and the importance of Gulf LPG for cooking and other domestic uses in Asia and Africa. Some large LPG consumption centres, notably India, are located very close to the Strait, meaning that the interruption to flows had an almost immediate impact on demand. Non-OECD consumption of the products is set to drop by 990 kb/d y-o-y over March-May, with 560 kb/d of this in the Middle East.

Cuts to Middle Eastern demand are concentrated in aviation, marine bunkers and petrochemicals. We estimate that the decline in air traffic at major Gulf hubs will see March-May jet/kerosene use fall by 130 kb/d y-o-y. Activity has dropped most significantly in the UAE (currently around 40% of pre-crisis levels based on *AirNav Radar* data), Qatar (25%), Saudi Arabia (80-90%) as well as in Iran, Iraq and Kuwait where there have been almost no recorded commercial flights since the start of the war. Flight disruptions to and from the Gulf have hit Asian jet fuel use, especially in Pakistan and India. Similarly, Middle Eastern marine bunker demand is being impacted by the dramatic fall in port visits and traffic passing the key Fujairah fuelling hub. Use of naphtha, LPG and ethane to produce petrochemicals is down considerably owing to attacks on plants, upstream disruptions and difficulty exporting to global markets (See *Petrochemicals at the Centre of Demand Destruction*).


Increased oil use in power generation may provide a modest boost to demand in situations where supplies of alternative fuels are disrupted, in the Middle East and beyond. Saudi Arabia could use some of its growing fuel flexibility, including burning more fuel oil, while Iraq could marginally increase domestic crude if gas availability is constrained. Countries like Pakistan and Bangladesh, which normally import LNG from the Gulf, may be able to burn more fuel oil. Egypt likely used more fuel oil in power plants while gas flows from Israel's Leviathan field were interrupted – piped volumes returned to pre-war levels in the first week of April.

Announced government demand-saving measures in several oil-importing countries, especially in South and Southeast Asia, are estimated to have the potential to save up to 400 kb/d of oil product consumption, although the initial impact is likely to be smaller. Non-OECD countries implementing

substantive measures to limit oil use include India, Pakistan, Nepal, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia, Vietnam, the Philippines, Myanmar, Cambodia, Laos, Egypt, Ethiopia, Mauritius, South Sudan, Argentina and Peru. These range from restrictions on air travel and mandatory teleworking for government employees to suspensions on work for major government construction projects, as well as additional public holidays or early closing of businesses.

Reported **Indian** demand was up by 60 kb/d y-o-y in March, despite the proximity and importance of Middle Eastern suppliers for the country. LPG/ethane and naphtha demand tumbled by 12.5% and 14% y-o-y, respectively, as petrochemical operators slashed rates and domestic cooking fuel supplies began to run short. By contrast, diesel deliveries leapt by 7.8%, while gasoline demand increased by 6.4%. Government controls mean that road fuel prices remain unchanged at the pump. In this context, it is likely that many consumers took the opportunity to increase their own stocks of fuel in anticipation of future disruptions, boosting demand in the short term. We expect year-on-year demand growth to turn slightly negative in April, but 2026 demand is still set to rise by 130 kb/d, dominated by gasoil and gasoline.

The Indian government has implemented various measures to stabilise the LPG market and to limit the impact on households. These include rationing, especially for commercial and industrial users, anti-hoarding measures, and promoting or allowing alternative cooking fuels. Roughly two-thirds of India's 2025 LPG use was supplied from the Gulf and there is no obvious alternative supplier for butane and propane on the scale required. Along with restrictions to oil product availability, interruptions to LNG, polymer and fertiliser imports will weigh on the wider economy. The *HSBC India Manufacturing PMI* suggested a considerable loss of momentum in March – falling to 53.9 from 56.9 in February. This is the lowest level since June 2022. Against the backdrop of rising import costs, the rupee slumped to a record low against the US dollar in late March. Nevertheless, our balances still assume very robust GDP gains, underpinning the rise in oil consumption.



China's oil demand has likely slipped into a modest year-on-year contraction in March and April, estimated at around an average of -110 kb/d. This projected decline is primarily due to a slowdown in activity in the world's largest petrochemical industry, with other sectors assumed to be less price responsive and less exposed to direct Gulf import flows. As with India, LPG shipments are expected to be particularly impacted. In early April, according to *Kpler* data, total LPG imports were down by 540 kb/d, or 40%, compared with year-earlier levels. In a further blow to petrochemical operators, naphtha imports also fell by 75%, although imports of the product account for a smaller share of overall demand. Shortages of polymers and synthetic fibres – exacerbated by the loss of Middle

East exports and even deeper production cuts in other Asian countries – will undermine output in various economic sectors, especially manufacturing and textiles.

China: Demand by Product								
(thousand barrels per day)								
	Demand				Annual Chg (kb/d)		Annual Chg (%)	
	2019	2024	2025	2026	2025	2026	2025	2026
LPG & Ethane	1 787	2 663	2 726	2 664	63	- 62	2.4	-2.3
Naphtha	1 392	2 296	2 412	2 551	117	138	5.1	5.7
Motor Gasoline	3 470	3 650	3 651	3 563	1	- 88	0.0	-2.4
Jet Fuel & Kerosene	906	938	966	999	28	33	3.0	3.4
Gas/Diesel Oil	3 607	3 661	3 651	3 678	- 9	27	-0.3	0.7
Residual Fuel Oil	450	595	581	578	- 14	- 3	-2.3	-0.6
Other Products	2 573	2 936	2 966	3 004	30	38	1.0	1.3
Total Products	14 184	16 738	16 954	17 036	216	83	1.3	0.5

Nevertheless, both the official National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) and private-sector *RatingDog China General Manufacturing PMI*, which focuses on small and medium-sized enterprises and is managed by *S&P Global*, showed modest expansions in March, with the NBS gauge displaying an acceleration from a minor contraction in February. While higher prices will hit demand, there are various factors that make the Chinese economy comparatively resilient to this shock. Diesel plays a major role in road freight, but the rapid recent penetration of battery- and natural gas-powered trucks has begun to provide some flexibility between fuel types. Compared with other major countries, the intensity of the Chinese economy for petroleum-derived fuels is low and falling. Combined with the large stocks of oil accumulated in the country over recent years and its highly diversified energy mix, this is likely to cushion the impact of the oil shock on the overall economy and the growth expectations used for this *Report* remain close to those from February.

Estimated demand increased by an average of 380 kb/d in January and February, based on NBS data for the two-month period covering the Lunar New Year holidays. An apparent mismatch between growth in refinery runs and product output may indicate substantial stock builds at refineries. Product stocks are not reported and are difficult to estimate. Naphtha was the primary engine of growth at the start of 2026, rising by 270 kb/d, underlining the importance of petrochemicals to China's demand outlook.


Non-OECD: Demand by Region								
(thousand barrels per day)								
	Demand				Annual Chg (kb/d)		Annual Chg (%)	
	2019	2024	2025	2026	2025	2026	2025	2026
Africa	4 181	4 546	4 745	4 830	199	86	4.4	1.8
Asia	28 360	31 726	32 233	32 483	507	250	1.6	0.8
Eurasia	4 663	4 815	4 833	4 824	18	- 10	0.4	-0.2
Latin America	6 281	6 454	6 583	6 649	128	66	2.0	1.0
Middle East	8 950	9 222	9 222	8 968	0	- 254	0.0	-2.8
Non-OECD Europe	776	832	838	851	6	13	0.7	1.6
Total Products	53 211	57 595	58 454	58 605	858	152	1.5	0.3

Singapore is the only large oil consumer where we have revised our demand expectations significantly higher in this *Report*. Bunker sales in February were 1.1 mb/d, up by 12.2% y-o-y. Recent data indicate that growth in the world's largest marine bunkering hub is outpacing its key competitors, with gains in fuel oil and gasoil deliveries outweighing hits to petrochemical and aviation demand. Overall 1Q26 demand was 60 kb/d higher y-o-y (+4.2%).


Supply

Overview

Global oil supply plummeted by 10.1 mb/d to 97 mb/d in March, with continued attacks on energy infrastructure in the Middle East and ongoing restrictions to tanker movements through the Strait of Hormuz leading to the largest disruption in history. OPEC+ production fell 9.4 mb/d m-o-m to 42.4 mb/d as sharply lower Gulf supply outweighed smaller gains led by Kazakhstan. Non-OPEC+ supply declined 770 kb/d m-o-m to 54.7 mb/d, as Qatari shut-ins offset record-high output in Brazil and a recovery in US production following winter disruptions.



Gulf oil exports (including crude and oil products) across all routes plunged by 15.8 mb/d m-o-m to 8.7 mb/d in March. Exports transiting the Strait averaged 2.3 mb/d, just 10% of pre-war levels, with Iran accounting for over 70% of flows. Strait of Hormuz crude and condensate exports dropped by 14.2 mb/d to 1.9 mb/d, refined products exports declined by 2.9 kb/d to 160 kb/d, and LPG exports fell by 1.2 mb/d to 280 kb/d.



Source: Kpler. Notes: Includes exports from Saudi Arabia, Iraq, UAE, Iran, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain and the Neutral Zone. Hormuz bypass includes loadings from Saudi Red Sea ports, UAE Fujairah, the Iraqi-Türkiye pipeline (ITP) from Ceyhan and Iran's Jask Oil Terminal.

By end-March, Saudi Arabia had re-routed supplies via its East-West Petroline, boosting Red Sea oil exports by 2.4 mb/d m-o-m to 4.4 mb/d. Despite repeated strikes on the port, crude exports from

UAE's Fujairah rose 450 kb/d m-o-m to average 1.6 mb/d. Northern Iraqi crude flows to Ceyhan resumed in late March but were 120 kb/d lower m-o-m, at 80 kb/d, after halting in early March due to security concerns. The two-week ceasefire agreed between the United States and Iran on 7 April may allow some of the near 210 oil-filled tankers stranded in the Gulf to exit.

With attacks on energy infrastructure continuing, our forecast carries significant uncertainty. In this *Report* we assume shipments through the Strait remain constrained until end-April followed by a gradual resumption of trade, with upstream production lagging. Where known, we have accounted for damage to energy infrastructure; this may be further revised when the full extent of impacts and recovery timelines are clearer. Downside risk to the forecast persists not only for Gulf countries, but also for Russia and Kazakhstan if attacks on Baltic and Black Sea ports escalate further.

We project global supply to fall a further 2.9 mb/d to 94.2 mb/d in April before starting to recover from mid-year. For the year as a whole, global supply is forecast to decline by 1.5 mb/d y-o-y to 104.7 mb/d. Forecast OPEC+ 2026 annual production is set to decline by a sharp 2.4 mb/d to 48.8 mb/d, largely due to losses from OPEC Gulf producers. We have revised Russian supply down by 120 kb/d for the remainder of the year due to persistent attacks on refineries and port infrastructure. Non-OPEC+ annual output will rise by 850 kb/d in 2026 to 55.9 mb/d as growth across the Americas Quintet more than offsets losses from Qatar.

World Oil Production by Region											
(million barrels per day)											
	2024	1Q25	2Q25	3Q25	4Q25	2025	1Q26	2Q26	3Q26	4Q26	2026
Africa	7.2	7.4	7.5	7.5	7.4	7.5	7.4	7.5	7.6	7.6	7.5
Latin America	7.4	7.7	7.8	8.2	8.5	8.0	8.5	8.6	8.9	9.0	8.7
North America	28.5	28.6	28.9	29.9	30.1	29.4	29.4	29.9	30.1	30.1	29.9
China	4.3	4.5	4.5	4.4	4.3	4.4	4.5	4.4	4.4	4.4	4.4
Other Asia	3.0	3.0	3.0	3.0	3.0	3.0	3.0	3.0	3.0	3.0	3.0
Europe	3.3	3.4	3.3	3.4	3.5	3.4	3.5	3.5	3.5	3.5	3.5
Eurasia	13.5	13.5	13.7	13.7	13.5	13.6	13.1	13.4	13.6	13.7	13.5
Middle East	30.2	30.1	30.9	31.7	31.9	31.2	28.6	22.1	30.4	31.6	28.2
Total Oil Production	97.4	98.2	99.5	101.8	102.2	100.4	98.1	92.5	101.4	102.8	98.7
Processing Gains	2.4	2.4	2.4	2.5	2.4	2.4	2.4	2.3	2.5	2.4	2.4
Global Biofuels	3.3	2.9	3.4	3.7	3.4	3.4	3.1	3.6	3.9	3.5	3.5
Total Supply	103.1	103.4	105.3	108.0	108.0	106.2	103.6	98.4	107.8	108.8	104.7
<i>OPEC Crude</i>	27.2	27.5	28.2	29.0	29.0	28.4	26.7	22.5	28.5	29.4	26.8
<i>OPEC NGLs¹</i>	5.5	5.5	5.6	5.7	5.7	5.6	5.3	4.1	5.4	5.5	5.1
<i>Non-OPEC OPEC+</i>	17.1	17.0	17.1	17.2	17.0	17.1	16.6	16.8	17.1	17.2	16.9
Total OPEC+	49.9	50.0	51.0	51.9	51.7	51.2	48.5	43.3	51.0	52.1	48.8


¹ Includes condensates reported by OPEC countries, oil from non-conventional sources, e.g. GTL in Nigeria and non-oil inputs to Saudi Arabian MTBE.

OPEC+ crude supply

OPEC+ crude supply plunged by 8.1 mb/d in March to 35.2 mb/d as OPEC Gulf crude production, excluding Qatar, declined by a sharp 8.9 mb/d due to the continued closure of the Strait of Hormuz and ongoing attacks on oil infrastructure. Losses from Gulf countries were moderately tempered by an 810 kb/d gain from other OPEC countries. Notably, Kazakhstan production rose by 460 kb/d as the Tengiz field returned to capacity following a January power plant outage.

The severe disruption in Middle East supplies and exports cut effective spare crude production capacity by 3.6 mb/d to a marginal 320 kb/d in March – the lowest level on record. The loss of Middle East spare capacity lays bare the vulnerability of oil markets to Gulf supply disruptions.

While March Iranian exports were on par with pre-war levels, every other country in the Gulf has suffered extreme export and supply losses. Saudi Arabia and the UAE have ramped up their bypass options via their Red Sea (Yanbu and Muajjiz) and Fujairah ports, respectively, to a combined 5.7 mb/d m-o-m, but these routes continue to remain vulnerable to attacks. Iraq has been the most severely affected from the loss of oil export revenues among major producers, as very limited financial buffers constrain its ability to withstand an extended closure of Hormuz. With exports from Saudi Arabia and the UAE's alternative pipelines restricted to lighter crude grades, heavier crude supplies from the two countries, plus Iraq and Kuwait, remain effectively locked in, for now.



Source: Kpler, IEA calculations. Notes: Other includes Kuwait, Qatar, and Bahrain. Bypass options includes loadings from Saudi Arabia's Red Sea ports, the UAE's Fujairah port, the Iraqi-Türkiye pipeline (ITP) terminus at Ceyhan and Iran's Jask Oil Terminal.

OPEC's 65th Joint Ministerial Monitoring Committee (JMMC) meeting held on 5 April issued a strongly worded statement condemning the attacks on energy infrastructure and ongoing disruptions to maritime flows. Following the JMMC, the OPEC+ group of eight countries endorsed a collective unwinding of output cuts by a further 206 kb/d beginning in May, contingent on improvements in regional security and return of shipping flows in the Strait. On paper, Saudi Arabia would provide the bulk of the upward adjustment, while other producers – Russia in particular – may struggle to increase production above early 1Q26 levels in the near-term given damage to port and energy infrastructure. Russian Baltic and Black Sea ports and refineries have been repeatedly damaged by Ukrainian drone strikes.

Gulf Production Curtailments: Rolling Back Out the Barrels

The war in the Middle East has caused major supply losses by disrupting logistics and supply chains and damaging energy infrastructure. Supply restoration hinges on the following key enablers: improved security and political stability, the resumption of Hormuz trade flows, the mobilisation of skilled labour and contractors, and the normalisation of supply chains, tanker insurance and financing. With these elements in place, most upstream oil fields that were prudently shut in and not physically damaged should be able to restart relatively quickly. Fields with low recovery rates and flow issues (low permeability or reservoir fluids containing significant asphaltene or wax) and new developments under construction may face delays of six months or more as teams remobilise, assess damages, approve operational plans and source equipment.

The ability of Gulf producers to increase exports depends critically on safe and sustained vessel transit through the Strait of Hormuz and other viable alternative routes. A central uncertainty is whether the Strait reopens fully or only partially, restricted by tanker type, flag, charter, upstream



producer, or destination. At the onset of the conflict, a total of 390 oil tankers (210 laden) were effectively trapped behind the Strait; over recent weeks, a net 49 vessels have exited. Few vessels are currently willing to re-enter without a clear cessation of hostilities, assured maritime security and severely elevated freight rates. Meanwhile, the number of tankers at ballast outside the Strait awaiting entry has declined, as vessels were redeployed elsewhere, and had started to increase in the days following the 7 April two-week ceasefire.

Upon a reopening of Hormuz and renewed security for trade flows, we estimate that it would take around two months to re-establish steady exports, and that initial volumes would remain below pre-conflict levels. First, oil-laden tankers will need to move out of the Gulf. Vessels currently ballasting in the Gulf could then load and drawdown stocks. It will be impossible to start upstream production or refining unless there is a foreseeable loading programme with adequate available storage at ports. During this time, companies will have to remobilise staff and assess field operability. Then, companies may begin steps to restart production.

Port storage constraints in some countries, notably Iraq, limit the ability to resume exports, and accordingly upstream production, until loading schedules are firmly restored. While port damage across the region was relatively limited at the time of writing, tanker availability and positioning become increasingly problematic the longer disruptions persist. The decline in tankers at ballast outside the Strait is a clear indicator that freight is picking up work elsewhere, adding time for vessels to reach the Gulf for first loadings.

Available financing and credit lines are needed to secure equipment and resources. While Kuwait and Qatar have ample resources to weather their current situation, and Saudi Arabia and the UAE are maintaining some oil revenues through export bypass routes, Iraqi and Bahraini finances are significantly weaker. Ahead of the war, Iraq had asked national operators to cut upstream capital spending, and the country still lacked a confirmed fiscal budget from the previous year. Even where some international companies can still access credit, constrained sovereign financing may slow investment decisions and push back the return to pre-war production levels for national oil companies.

An estimated 50% of Gulf country upstream fields have sufficient reservoir pressure and fluid characteristics to return to pre-war levels within approximately two weeks, rising to 80% around one month later. This is contingent upon the security situation in each country, the ability of companies to mobilise skilled labour and contractors, and the normalisation of supply chains, all of which could significantly constrain the return to pre-war production rates. The remaining 20% of fields face more complex restart challenges, such as pressure depletion or



flow impairment from wax or asphaltene deposition. Fields that are more complex to restart are not evenly distributed among countries: as a percent of total production, Iraq and Kuwait have more low-pressure fields and produce predominately heavier crude grades. According to *Kpler*, around three-quarters of Gulf countries' pre-war crude exports come in the form of light and medium grade crudes that may be less likely to develop chemical issues due to wax or asphaltenes.


Some fields may require specialised oilfield services, including workovers, coiled-tubing units, chemical treatments or perforation. Depleted wells may need fluid columns to be lifted out of the well to lower hydrostatic pressure before they will flow. While some equipment and materials may be readily available, others such as explosives for perforation could take months to secure due to regulatory and permitting constraints. Rotating equipment, like that used for compression in many gas fields and some depleted oil fields, tends to break down when not used consistently and can incur lead times of over 18-months to replace.

Fields requiring secondary or enhanced oil recovery operations, such as steam or chemical flooding, may face longer restart timelines given their dependence on uninterrupted supplies of gas, power, steam and chemicals. Disruptions to power or gas infrastructure can halt production entirely and damage equipment. Fields reliant on electric submersible pumps, like those in southern Iraq, are especially vulnerable to power instability, with repairs potentially extending the return to pre-crisis production levels. Ultimately, some pre-conflict production may not return.

Saudi Arabia's crude supply declined 3.1 mb/d m-o-m to 7.3 mb/d in March. Total crude exports, including those exiting the Strait and loadings from the Red Sea, fell by 3.5 mb/d to 3.4 mb/d on average. Crude pipeline flows started ramping up on the East-West Petroline in early March, with crude exports from the country's west coast rising by 2.5 mb/d m-o-m in March to an average of 3.3 mb/d. In early April, Red Sea crude loadings were just over 4.2 mb/d.




The scale of both reduced and bypassed production underscores the Kingdom's exposure to chokepoint risks and infrastructure attacks, even with significant redundancy built into its upstream system. Saudi Aramco announced on 9 March that offshore fields were curtailed, especially those producing medium and heavier crudes that are

unable to flow via the Petroline, resulting in nearly 2.5 mb/d of shut-in production. More than 600 kb/d of crude production was lost on the month due to drone strikes on downstream facilities and storage constraints. Saudi has defended itself against repeated attacks on its oil infrastructure but nonetheless suffered damage to the Ras Tanura integrated refinery and petrochemical units as well as its refinery facilities at Jubail. On 9 April, Saudi Arabia's Ministry of Energy announced that Iranian attacks on oil infrastructure had cut the East-West pipeline flows by 700 kb/d and reduced production capacity at Manifa and Khurais by 600 kb/d. **Neutral Zone** production, shared equally between Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, declined by 380 kb/d in March, to just over 30 kb/d, with the last cargo loaded at Khafji on 11 March.



Kuwaiti crude production fell 1.4 mb/d m-o-m to 1.2 mb/d, with exports down from 1.2 mb/d in February to zero after the start of the war. Crude stocks rose 330 kb/d in March, according to *Kayrros* data, reducing available storage to around 14 mb. Repeated attacks on the country's refineries and limited storage have necessitated a cut in upstream production, estimated at over 1.9 mb/d at the start of April.

The **UAE** cut crude output by 1.3 mb/d m-o-m to 2.4 mb/d in March, with offshore production accounting for the majority of losses. Crude exports sank 1.9 mb/d m-o-m to 1.6 mb/d. Despite repeated attacks on the Fujairah energy hub, crude loadings from the port increased by 450 kb/d to 1.6 mb/d, with exports out of the ADCOP terminal at 1.5 mb/d. The UAE's 42 mb underground crude storage is located at Fujairah, allowing the country to lean on inventories to supplement crude flows in the event of disruptions. Attacks on the Habshan gas complex and the Borouge petrochemical facility at Ruwais have severely curtailed UAE NGLs production, with nearly 500 kb/d estimated to be offline at the time of writing.




Iraq crude supply plummeted by 3 mb/d m-o-m to 1.6 mb/d in March. With limited storage at the country's southern ports, production shut-ins started as early as 2 March at major fields, including South Rumaila (700 kb/d), West Qurna-2 (450 kb/d) and Maysan (325 kb/d). Iraqi fields have been the subject of multiple attacks, especially at Majnoon, Burzurgan, and Maysan. Security concerns in Kurdistan necessitated the shut-in of several fields and initially the Iraqi-Türkiye Pipeline (ITP) line but loadings from Ceyhan recommenced from 26 March, resulting in an overall monthly decline in exports through this route of 120 kb/d m-o-m to 80 kb/d. Crude volumes transiting via Hormuz declined by 3.4 mb/d m-o-m to just under 40 kb/d.

Iraq is potentially the most severely affected among major producers, with more than 3.2 mb/d of production currently shut in. With the country's budget highly reliant on oil revenues and over 90% of exports blocked behind the Strait, Iraq has worked on several additional options to sell oil. State Oil Marketing Organisation Director General Ali Nizar al-Shatari announced that the country had signed a contract to truck 50 kb/d from southern fields to Syria's Banias port for export. In early April,

Iraq announced that Iran had granted an exemption for Iraqi oil to pass through the Strait and put out a call for sales; however, at the time of writing Iraqi oil flows through the Strait remained severely constrained with few non-sanctioned tankers willing to enter the Strait.


Iranian crude production has proved resilient, staying broadly flat in March at 3.6 mb/d, supported by ample onshore storage and continued tanker loadings. Crude exports transiting the Strait declined 440 kb/d from their multi-year high in February to 1.8 mb/d in March. While upstream crude oil flows have remained relatively robust, attacks have severely damaged key natural gas liquids and petrochemical infrastructure. On 18 March, Israeli drone strikes hit the Asaluyeh gas complex processing hub that handles gas from the South Pars field, with visible damage to Phases 6/7 and Phases 17/18. In early April, additional Israeli attacks damaged petrochemical facilities at Shiraz and Mahshahr and two power plants serving the Asaluyeh complex. Iran's crude oil production forecast from April was lifted 60 kb/d to 3.4 mb/d to account for consistently higher supply.



Bahrain crude output declined 140 kb/d in March to 40 kb/d and is now offline. With limited domestic storage, no export options and multiple attacks on its new 400 kb/d refinery, the country shut-in portions of domestic production. The Abu Safah field, shared with Saudi Arabia and operated by Aramco, was shut-in on 9 March. The country received cargoes of products from Saudi Arabia's Jubail refinery in early April to meet domestic demand.


Oman crude supply rose 40 kb/d m-o-m to 840 kb/d. Crude exports increased by 80 kb/d in March to 940 kb/d, while refinery runs fell by 40 kb/d as Kuwaiti crude imports into the Duqm refinery, a joint venture between Kuwait Petroleum International and the Oman Oil Company, dropped from 140 kb/d to zero. Virtually all of the country's coastline lies outside of the Strait of Hormuz but attacks on the Duqm and Salalah ports and oil infrastructure have caused significant damage.

Kazakhstan pushed crude production close to full capacity in March, up 460 kb/d to 1.9 mb/d. Output at the Tengiz field was restored at the end of February following a fire that impacted its power supply. Kazakh crude loadings from Novorossiysk rose by 580 kb/d m-o-m to nearly 1.7 mb/d, while KEBCO loadings from Ust Luga remained broadly flat and stocks drew. With ongoing attacks at both Ust Luga and the Novorossiysk ports, downside risks to the forecast remain.



Russian crude supply increased 290 kb/d m-o-m to 9 mb/d but remained 230 kb/d below the same time last year as attacks on oil infrastructure intensified in the second half of the month. Following damage to multiple sites, including crude distillation units at the Kirishi refinery, forecast refinery runs were cut by 270 kb/d in 2Q26. A series


of strikes on Baltic and Black Sea ports temporarily halted loadings and reduced exports by 450 kb/d in the first week of April compared to the March average. While some Baltic Sea crude exports may be redirected via pipeline to Novorossiysk on the Black Sea, the Sheskhari port on the Black Sea was targeted on 6 April. Prior to the most recent disruptions, Russia loaded nearly 60% of the country's seaborne crude exports through the Primorsk, Ust Luga and Novorossiysk ports. We have lowered Russia's 2Q26 crude forecast by 330 kb/d, in line with the reduction in refining runs and assuming damage to port infrastructure impacts next months' loadings.



Russia's Total Exports Revenues: Gulf War Boosting Revenues

Russian crude and oil product exports rose by 320 kb/d m-o-m to 7.1 mb/d in March, while oil export revenues nearly doubled, from \$9.7 billion to \$19 billion as global oil prices surged. Crude exports rose by 270 kb/d m-o-m to 4.6 mb/d, mostly driven by higher seaborne shipments (+300 kb/d m-o-m) as the Druzhba pipeline remained offline. Product exports were broadly stable, edging up by 50 kb/d m-o-m to 2.5 mb/d.

An embargo on gasoline exports announced by the Russian government took effect on 1 April. The Gulf war lifted overall Russian crude prices by \$32.70/bbl m-o-m to \$78.38/bbl, sharply boosting crude export revenues to \$11.5 billion, \$2.2 billion higher y-o-y. Product revenues followed a similar trend, rising by \$3.9 billion m-o-m to \$7.6 billion, as diesel and fuel oil prices jumped by 88% and 93%, to \$143.82/bbl and \$61.10/bbl, respectively.



Importing countries received 4.4 mb/d of Russian crude oil in March, with India unloading 2 mb/d and China 1.8 mb/d. Indian crude imports rose by 930 kb/d m-o-m after the United States waived restrictions on purchases for cargoes loaded before 5 March. An estimated 22 mb of Russian oil on water came onshore in India in March, and 14 mb in China, wiping out the volumes at sea that had built up since October 2025. In March, twelve Indian refineries processed Russian crude, compared with seven in February.


Russian Crude and Product Exports (mb/d)										
	2022	2023	2024	2025	Dec-25	Jan-26	Feb-26	Mar-26	m-o-m	y-o-y
Total Crude	5.11	4.91	4.78	4.78	5.00	4.66	4.35	4.62	0.27	-0.17
pipeline and rail	1.85	1.40	1.31	1.31	1.26	1.25	1.09	1.06	-0.03	-0.20
seaborne	3.25	3.52	3.47	3.47	3.74	3.41	3.26	3.56	0.30	0.02
Total Products	2.98	2.97	2.73	2.57	2.60	2.81	2.46	2.51	0.05	-0.13
Gasoline	0.16	0.21	0.17	0.12	0.07	0.07	0.08	0.09	0.01	-0.10
Gasoil	0.95	0.96	0.87	0.82	1.00	1.01	0.82	0.84	0.02	-0.10
Resid+VGO	1.08	1.02	0.95	0.88	0.72	0.95	0.79	0.79	-0.01	-0.08
Jet-Kero	0.04	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.07	0.06	0.07	0.06	-0.01	0.00
Naphtha+NGLs+LPG	0.65	0.63	0.59	0.61	0.71	0.69	0.66	0.69	0.03	0.14
Total	8.09	7.88	7.51	7.36	7.60	7.47	6.81	7.13	0.32	-0.30
Total Revenue (\$Bn)	252.93	188.67	192.42	158.19	10.94	10.99	9.75	19.04	9.29	4.76
... of which crude	146.51	118.49	123.28	101.26	6.82	6.61	6.04	11.45	5.41	2.25
... of which product	106.42	70.18	69.14	56.93	4.12	4.38	3.71	7.59	3.88	2.51

Sources: IEA, Kpler, Argus Media Group

Following earlier strikes on the Black Sea port of Novorossiysk, Ukrainian drones targeted the Baltic ports of Ust-Luga and Primorsk during the week of 23 March. At Primorsk, around 8 of 18 crude storage tanks were destroyed, while satellite imagery showed fires and heavy smoke at Ust-Luga, affecting crude oil tanks and potentially the 160 kb/d crude splitter. The attacks halted Primorsk exports for several days, while Ust-Luga remained offline for more than a week. Loadings at Primorsk resumed two days after the attacks and averaged 1.4 mb/d in the week of 6 April while Ust-Luga loadings remained 300 kb/d below 2025 levels.

There is no pipeline connection between the two Baltic ports, requiring upstream scheduling adjustments. While rerouting crude to the Black Sea is technically feasible, only 23% of volumes exported last month were Russian crude, from Sheskhari, with the remainder originating from Kazakhstan and loaded from the CPC terminal.


Together, the three ports accounted for around 68% of seaborne oil exports in 2025 shipped from Russian ports, comprising 72% crude and 28% products. Beyond Russia's export logistics, 80% of India's Russian crude imports in 2025 originated from Primorsk, Ust-Luga and Novorossiysk. Indian total crude imports fell by 760 kb/d m-o-m in March, and any prolonged disruption to Russian port availability could significantly affect Indian refining operations in the coming weeks.



African OPEC+ crude production declined 70 kb/d to 4.2 mb/d. **Nigerian** crude supply increased 40 kb/d m-o-m to 1.4 mb/d, as Bonga returned to production during the second half of March following scheduled maintenance but was still well below recent highs. **Algerian** crude output declined marginally, by 15 kb/d, to 960 kb/d. March crude exports dropped by 130 kb/d m-o-m to 390 kb/d due to port interruptions but early April loadings were markedly higher.

Libyan crude output fell 50 kb/d in March to 1.2 mb/d. A pipeline valve failure and subsequent fire at the Sharara oilfield in mid-March forced operators to reroute flows and shut El Feel, reducing Libya's output over several days. On 12 March, TotalEnergies announced the restart of the 25 kb/d Mabruk field, marking an incremental step in rebuilding upstream capacity and attracting renewed investment.

Venezuelan crude supply continued to recover in March, rising 120 kb/d m-o-m to 980 kb/d. Crude exports increased 80 kb/d to 860 kb/d, with nearly one-third destined for India, while estimated refining runs were up by 40 kb/d. Despite the uptick in exports, onshore and offshore inventories remain near their highest levels since 2H20, at nearly 40 mb, according to *Kpler* data. On 27 March, the U.S. Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) issued general licenses 51A, 54 and 55 that allow controlled trade in Venezuelan-origin minerals, supply of goods and services to existing operations, and provide for the negotiation of future investments.



OPEC+ Crude Oil Production (excluding condensates)							
(million barrels per day)							
	Feb 2026	Mar 2026	m-o-m	Mar 2026	Mar 2026	Sustainable	Eff Spare Cap
	Supply	Supply	change	vs Target	Implied Target ¹	Capacity ²	vs March ³
Algeria	0.98	0.96	-0.01	-0.01	0.97	1.0	0.0
Congo	0.30	0.27	-0.03	-0.01	0.28	0.3	0.0
Equatorial Guinea	0.07	0.06	-0.01	-0.01	0.07	0.1	0.0
Gabon	0.20	0.19	-0.01	0.01	0.18	0.2	0.0
Iraq	4.57	1.57	-2.99	-2.59	4.16	4.9	n/a
Kuwait	2.54	1.19	-1.35	-1.39	2.58	2.9	n/a
Nigeria	1.31	1.35	0.04	-0.15	1.50	1.4	0.1
Saudi Arabia	10.40	7.25	-3.15	-2.85	10.10	12.1	n/a
UAE	3.64	2.37	-1.26	-1.02	3.39	4.3	n/a
Total OPEC-9	23.99	15.22	-8.77	-8.01	23.23	27.1	0.1
Iran ⁴	3.69	3.63	-0.05			3.8	
Libya ⁴	1.28	1.23	-0.05			1.3	0.0
Venezuela ⁴	0.86	0.98	0.12			1.0	0.0
Total OPEC	29.82	21.07	-8.76			33.2	0.2
Azerbaijan	0.47	0.47	-0.01	-0.09	0.55	0.5	0.0
Kazakhstan	1.43	1.88	0.45	0.93	0.95	1.8	0.0
Mexico ⁵	1.40	1.39	-0.01			1.5	0.1
Oman	0.80	0.84	0.04	0.04	0.80	0.8	n/a
Russia	8.67	8.96	0.29	-0.61	9.57	9.4	
Others ⁶	0.78	0.63	-0.15	-0.24	0.87	0.9	n/a
Total Non-OPEC	13.55	14.17	0.62	0.03	12.75	14.8	0.1
OPEC+ 18 in Nov 2022 deal⁵	36.14	28.00	-8.14	-7.98	35.98	40.4	0.1
Total OPEC+	43.37	35.24	-8.13			48.0	0.3

1 Includes extra voluntary curbs and compensation cutback volumes.

2 Capacity levels can be reached within 90 days and sustained for an extended period.

3 Production over estimated capacity stated as zero.

4 Iran, Libya, Venezuela exempt from cuts.


5 Mexico excluded from OPEC+ compliance.

6 Bahrain, Brunei, Malaysia, Sudan and South Sudan.

Non-OPEC+

Non-OPEC+ output declined by 770 kb/d m-o-m in March, to 54.7 mb/d, dragged down by shut-in Qatari volumes. The 1.4 mb/d loss from the Gulf producer was partially offset by a second month of recovering US supply after winter storm Fern, a continued surge in Brazilian output, and gains in both Norway and Canada.

Non-OPEC+ production growth is forecast at 850 kb/d this year, bringing total supply to an average 55.9 mb/d. Disruptions in Qatar will weigh on output even after shipping traffic through the Strait normalises given the long timeline needed to repair extensive damage to facilities. Elsewhere, increases will be driven by Norway and the Americas Quintet – comprised of the United States, Canada, Brazil, Guyana and Argentina. Combined, these six countries are expected to deliver close to 1.4 mb/d of new supply this year.



US oil production rose by 540 kb/d m-o-m in March to 21.6 mb/d, fully recovering from January’s harsh weather-related losses. Crude output was up 260 kb/d to 13.8 mb/d, with light tight oil (LTO) accounting for 190 kb/d. NGLs increased by 270 kb/d to 7.7 mb/d.

In January, the latest month for which official data are available from the Energy Information Administration (EIA), total US supply plummeted by 820 kb/d m-o-m to 20.6 mb/d. Crude production fell by 410 kb/d, with Texas and New Mexico accounting for 380 kb/d of the losses as winter weather brought parts of the country to a standstill for a number of days. This was evident in NGLs output as well, with 350 kb/d of the 390 kb/d of losses localised in the Gulf Coast (PADD 3) region.

Total US oil supply is set to increase by 460 kb/d this year to 21.6 mb/d, with crude rising by 190 kb/d and NGLs up by 270 kb/d. Crude growth will be split between federal offshore, LTO and Alaskan volumes. Gains of 100 kb/d from federal offshore production are led by capacity ramp ups while the startup of Pikka will help buoy Alaskan output by 30 kb/d. US LTO growth has been revised upwards by 90 kb/d to 150 kb/d on the year.


Capital Discipline and Permian Bottlenecks Temper US Shale Growth

Business sentiment in the US shale sector has improved markedly in recent months amid higher oil prices, even as market uncertainty has increased. A sharp drawdown in global stocks and changing

future price expectations have prompted some speculation over potential budget revisions, although most producers continue to proceed cautiously.


Indeed, results from the 1Q26 Dallas Fed Energy Survey, conducted between 11-19 March, show business sentiment rising sharply to a near four-year high across the US shale sector. Responses from 135 energy firms (92 producers and 43 oilfield service companies) also point to an average \$2/bbl increase in breakeven prices across surveyed regions, broadly in line with last year’s results. Despite the improvement in sentiment, however, more than two-thirds of large E&Ps reported no plans to increase activity relative to the start of the year.

Output growth is currently tempered by tight pipeline capacity, logistical frictions and management decisions. Pipeline bottlenecks are most acute in the Permian Basin, where gas takeaway capacity is effectively full and unlikely to ease materially until new infrastructure comes online in 2H26, constraining oil growth given high levels of associated gas production. This has been underscored by two consecutive months of negative Waha gas prices and *East Daley Analytics* estimates that the Permian Basin had close to 1.5 bcf/d (~250 kboe/d) of gas oversupply in February. While additional capacity is expected to alleviate some pressure, most analysts anticipate that utilisation will rapidly fill capacity as operators increase flows from existing wells and reduce flaring.




Beyond infrastructure, operational and organisational constraints also weigh on activity. Mobilising rigs, reallocating budgets and adjusting staffing schedules involve time lags and typically require management approval. Together with sustained capital discipline and ongoing consolidation, these factors have reduced the responsiveness of US LTO supply to price signals.

Should operators choose to ramp up activity, initially by drawing down drilled but uncompleted wells (DUCs) and subsequently by increasing drilling to sustain higher completion rates, we estimate that up to an additional 250 kb/d of supply could be brought online by year-end.



Note: Rig data are from April 2020 - April 2026 and include horizontal oil drilling rigs. Prices are from Jan 2020 - Jan 2026. Sources: FRED and Baker Hughes Rig Count.





Sources: Primary Vision and Baker Hughes Rig Count.

This upside potential has been reinforced by recent price developments. Since the survey was conducted, front-month WTI prices have remained above \$89/bbl, while December 2026 WTI has traded in a relatively narrow \$70-80/bbl range. A higher strip price for the remainder of the year is

likely to encourage optimisation of existing infrastructure, improve the attractiveness of hedging programmes and support moderate activity increases later in the year. The longer that pricing stays elevated, compared to when budgets were formulated, the higher the probability of upward revisions to capex and a subsequent rise in rig counts. Moreover, should the resumption of flows from Gulf producers be slower than assumed in this *Report*, further upward revisions to US LTO production in the second half of this year and into 2027 could be warranted.



Canadian supply rose by 70 kb/d m-o-m in March, to 6.5 mb/d, as growth in NGLs and upgrader output more than offset a small drop in bitumen volumes. February saw production fall by 50 kb/d, with losses spread amongst bitumen, upgraders and NGLs. Other upgrader output, including historical data, have been revised this month. These data represent non-crude volumes (varying quantities of refinery gas, naphtha, diesel/gasoil and petcoke) from bitumen upgraders that directly enter the product pool as communicated by the government. Additionally, Canada's support of 24 mb to the IEA collective action has been incorporated in this *Report* over 2Q26 and 3Q26. Annual oil production has been revised up by 40 kb/d this month, with supply now expected to increase by 100 kb/d to 6.5 mb/d on average.



Note: Piped exports to PADD 5 via Sumas terminal. Canada includes domestic crude and product flows, estimated beyond CER data availability. Sources: *Kpler*, Canadian Energy Regulator, US EIA.



The Trans Mountain Expansion (TMX) pipeline, which moves a mix of products and crude oil to the Canadian West Coast, saw flows increase by close to 110 kb/d m-o-m in March, to 780 kb/d, based on data from *Kpler* and the Canadian Energy Regulator. Preliminary April data from *Kpler* suggest that flows are up another 80 kb/d to 860 kb/d on the month, with most of the incremental loadings over March and April destined for Asia.

Brazilian production hit a second consecutive record high in March, having increased by 100 kb/d m-o-m to 4.3 mb/d, based on provisional data from the Agência Nacional do Petróleo (ANP). This follows official ANP data that showed supply rose by 110 kb/d in February. The higher volumes have been unlocked by seven new offshore installations brought online since 2024, with a combined capacity close to 1.1 mb/d.



Additionally, Brazilian independent Prio and TotalEnergies saw first oil in March from their Wahoo and Lapa South-West projects, respectively. Combined, these two projects account for 70 kb/d of new capacity. Petrobras is expected to bring online its eighth floating production storage and offloading vessel (FPSO), with 180 kb/d of capacity, at the Búzios field later this year. Meanwhile, next year will see four more FPSO's totalling 740 kb/d of capacity commissioned. Annual growth in 2026 has been revised higher by 80 kb/d this month to 400 kb/d, bringing average output to 4.2 mb/d.

Data from the Norwegian Offshore Directorate (NOD) show production in February fell by 50 kb/d m-o-m to 2.2 mb/d. Volumes recovered in March by 60 kb/d, led by Johan Castberg and Johan Sverdrup. Annual supply of 2.2 mb/d is expected this year, 130 kb/d higher than in 2025.





Qatari oil exports came to a halt in early March following Iranian strikes on the Ras Laffan and Mesaieed Industrial Cities. These attacks effectively shut in all associated field condensate and NGLs output as well as moderate crude oil volumes, reducing supplies to 370 kb/d, a 1.4 mb/d m-o-m loss. Except for a few early-month cargoes, Qatari crude oil production is currently limited to domestic stock builds and use at the Umm Said refinery, albeit with runs curtailed. This *Report* has revised output lower for the remainder of the year, with April supply of 200 kb/d marking the nadir, before volumes recover to 1.5 mb/d by the end of 3Q26. The annualised impact amounts to 670 kb/d, bringing output to 1.2 mb/d on the year.


Refining

Overview


Global crude throughputs continue to struggle with disruptions to feedstock supplies and infrastructure damage that are tightening global product markets. The failure to reach a ceasefire agreement on 11 April and lack of clarity over potential future negotiations will see the impact worsen in 2Q26. April crude runs are cut by around 6 mb/d across Asia and the Middle East. This loss of product supply would have been greater were it not for the recent easing of US sanctions on Russian and Iranian crude. The more protracted assumptions around conflict duration cuts forecast crude runs to 77.2 mb/d for April, 79.5 mb/d for 2Q26 and 82.9 mb/d for the year as a whole and results in a 1 mb/d cut in runs y-o-y.



Extreme volatility in crude and product prices buffeted refinery margins during March. Asian margins collapsed in the face of surging Dubai crude pricing mid-month but subsequently returned to positive territory as middle distillate cracks soared above \$150/bbl. Record cash premia for crudes against futures markets further squeezed profitability, with negative gasoline, naphtha and residue cracks in Europe and Asia signalling that challenges remain.



Source: IEA analysis based on data from Argus Media Group.




Source: IEA analysis based on data from Argus Media Group.

Regional refining developments

Global refining activity continues to be severely affected by the closure of the Strait of Hormuz. Middle East runs dropped nearly 30% in March as physical attacks on infrastructure and the loss of access to export markets cut throughputs by nearly 3 mb/d. The sharp decline in Middle East crude exports during March forced Asian refineries to lower runs by a further 2.7 mb/d, either on a precautionary basis, or due to a lack of crude. Elsewhere, the escalation of attacks on Russian refining capacity has cut April throughput estimates by 600 kb/d m-o-m.

The impact on runs from these disruptions increased in early April, as the full consequences of the hole punched in the crude supply chain takes time to manifest itself. Consistent with assumptions throughout this *Report*, we expect crude runs will trough at 77.2 mb/d in April, down 5.2 mb/d y-o-y and 5.8 mb/d below the February OMR's pre-conflict assessment of the month. Thereafter a gradual normalisation of crude and product trade through the Strait would enable refinery activity to slowly recover over the course of 2Q26 and 3Q26. However, at this juncture the longer-term implications for crude runs from damage to Middle Eastern energy infrastructure remain unclear and we have lowered forecast regional crude runs by 1 mb/d for the balance of the year. Nevertheless, the sharp drawdown in crude and product inventories in recent weeks will likely support margins over the balance of the quarter, if not longer.

Crude supply options for many refineries in Asia remain precarious. Inventory data indicate that non-OECD Asia refineries (excluding China) typically hold around 230 mb of crude inventories, equivalent to just 22 days of cover. The region normally secures more than 80% of its needs from extra-regional imports and the Middle East accounts for almost half of these volumes. Consequently, the loss of imports from Gulf states has denied vital crude supplies to refineries that cannot easily replace lost volumes from other sources. Sanctions waivers have eased restrictions on Russian and Iranian cargoes on the water, and non-OECD Asia Russian import volumes doubled as a result in March. However, the drawdown of oil already on the water is only a temporary fix and one that cannot be relied on in the coming months. Increased purchases of Atlantic Basin crudes, notably West African and Latin American grades, offer only a partial offset. If flows through the Strait of Hormuz recover from May onwards, then some Asian refineries can probably avoid running out of crude. Others will have to cut runs further to stay within operational levels of inventory cover. Further delays in restarting supplies via the Strait will foment broader run cuts.



A minor offset to these downgrades comes from OECD Americas, where processing rates have bounced back from the cold weather outage of January to hit nine-year highs on a seasonally adjusted basis, despite the closure of 1.1 mb/d of capacity in the intervening period. The United States has led the surge in throughputs, with utilisation set to reach 93% in April, four percentage points above year-ago levels. Elsewhere, strong Canadian crude runs have supported the regional total, as has the sustained improvement in Mexican crude processing. February data point to Mexican throughputs bouncing back from January's levels to within 20 kb/d of the ten-year high reached in December 2025. In part, this reflects continued progress at the Dos Bocas refinery as well as other key refineries improving operations, notably the 315 kb/d Tula refinery that hit a ten-year

high of 252 kb/d during the month. Elsewhere, combined January and February data for China were substantially ahead of expectations, in line with stronger domestic demand.

Global Refinery Crude Throughput ¹													
(million barrels per day)													
	2023	2024	Jan-26	Feb-26	Mar-26	1Q26	Apr-26	May-26	Jun-26	2Q26	Jul-26	2025	2026
Americas	18.7	19.1	19.5	19.2	19.7	19.5	19.5	19.6	20.3	19.8	20.4	19.4	19.7
Europe	11.4	11.3	11.2	11.0	11.0	11.1	11.3	11.0	11.2	11.2	11.7	11.3	11.2
Asia Oceania	5.9	5.7	6.3	6.1	5.4	5.9	5.4	5.2	5.4	5.3	5.6	5.7	5.7
Total OECD	36.0	36.1	36.9	36.3	36.1	36.4	36.2	35.7	36.9	36.2	37.6	36.4	36.6
Eurasia	6.5	6.3	6.4	6.2	6.1	6.2	5.6	6.1	6.3	6.0	6.3	6.2	6.3
Non-OECD Europe	0.4	0.5	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.5	0.5	0.4
China	14.8	14.5	15.2	15.2	14.0	14.8	13.8	13.7	14.6	14.1	14.7	14.8	14.7
Other Asia	10.5	10.6	11.0	10.8	10.0	10.6	9.4	9.6	10.2	9.7	10.5	10.7	10.4
Latin America	3.7	3.7	3.8	3.8	3.8	3.8	3.6	3.7	3.9	3.2	3.8	3.7	3.7
Middle East	8.7	9.3	10.0	9.8	7.1	9.0	6.2	8.1	9.2	7.8	9.1	9.5	8.7
Africa	1.6	1.9	1.9	1.9	2.1	2.0	2.1	2.0	2.1	2.1	2.2	2.1	2.1
Total Non-OECD	46.3	46.7	48.8	48.1	43.5	46.8	41.0	43.5	46.8	43.3	47.1	47.5	46.3
Total	82.3	82.9	85.7	84.4	79.6	83.2	77.2	79.2	83.6	79.5	84.7	83.9	82.9
Y-O-Y change	1.1	0.6	2.5	2.0	-3.1	0.4	-5.2	-2.9	-1.6	-3.7	-0.9	1.0	-1.0

¹ Preliminary and estimated runs based on capacity, known outages, economic runcuts and global demand forecast.

In aggregate, January and February runs have been revised higher by an average of 320 kb/d from last month's *Report*. Stronger US crude runs are carried through our forecasts, but this is a lonely positive revision against a sea of negative adjustments in the wake of the Middle East supply losses, lower Asian runs and reduced expectations for Russian throughputs in the short term. Overall, 2026 crude runs are reduced by 950 kb/d from the March *Report* to 82.9 mb/d, with 2Q26 cut by 2.5 mb/d to 79.5 mb/d. Similarly, 2H26 forecasts have been lowered by 710 kb/d, to 84.4 mb/d, as a 350 kb/d upgrade to OECD Americas runs is more than offset by a 1 mb/d reduction to Middle East estimates.

The market dynamics that have unfolded since the start of March have severely tested refiners' risk management and margin capture capabilities. The loss of crude supplies to Asian markets pushed Dubai pricing to \$165/bbl in mid-month, while North Sea Dated sat below \$130/bbl all month. Similarly, Singapore jet fuel prices initially spiked to \$240/bbl before subsiding to \$200/bbl, and while diesel prices were slower to rally, they nevertheless hit \$290/bbl in early April. By contrast, gasoline and naphtha prices in Europe have seen more modest increases, with prices not exceeding \$130/bbl and \$116/bbl, respectively, since the start of March. These wildly divergent trends reflect different market drivers with structural regional trade flows dictating pricing.

OECD refinery activity

OECD crude throughputs fell in February to 36.3 mb/d, as the fallout from January's North American cold snap cut activity levels. The m-o-m drop of 590 kb/d pushed the cumulative loss since the six-year high reached in December to 2 mb/d, with the start of planned maintenance underpinning most of the decline in Europe and Asia Oceania. Crude runs are estimated to have fallen further in March, to around 36 mb/d, dragged lower by weaker processing rates in Japan and Korea, as refineries trimmed activity levels following the outbreak of the conflict in the Middle East. OECD crude runs are expected to remain close to this level through May, before rebounding into 3Q26.

Refinery Crude Throughput and Utilisation in OECD Countries

(million barrels per day)


	Sep 25	Oct 25	Nov 25	Dec 25	Jan 26	Feb 26	Change from		Utilisation rate ³	
							Jan 26	Feb 25	Feb 26	Feb 25
US ¹	16.46	15.53	16.63	16.99	16.33	15.91	-0.43	0.55	89%	84%
Canada	1.82	1.84	1.92	1.92	1.85	1.90	0.05	0.08	101%	97%
Chile	0.23	0.23	0.23	0.23	0.21	0.23	0.01	0.02	89%	80%
Mexico	0.95	1.04	1.14	1.22	1.07	1.19	0.12	0.29	61%	50%
OECD Americas¹	19.46	18.63	19.93	20.36	19.46	19.22	-0.24	0.94	87%	82%
France	1.02	1.03	1.04	1.04	0.96	0.95	-0.01	0.04	77%	73%
Germany	1.69	1.72	1.73	1.69	1.65	1.64	-0.01	0.03	86%	78%
Italy	1.29	1.07	1.05	1.27	1.11	1.14	0.03	-0.02	70%	71%
Netherlands	1.00	1.08	1.12	1.07	1.03	1.06	0.03	0.04	85%	82%
Spain	1.25	1.31	1.26	1.26	1.13	1.08	-0.05	-0.16	74%	84%
United Kingdom	0.87	0.91	0.86	0.89	0.90	0.88	-0.02	0.02	92%	71%
Other OECD Europe ²	4.29	3.94	3.92	4.45	4.39	4.20	-0.19	0.06	86%	85%
OECD Europe	11.42	11.06	10.98	11.68	11.17	10.95	-0.22	0.02	82%	80%
Japan	2.34	2.37	2.44	2.78	2.75	2.66	-0.09	0.28	86%	77%
Korea	2.79	2.75	2.90	3.00	2.99	2.95	-0.05	0.19	83%	77%
Other Asia Oceania ²	0.41	0.50	0.51	0.53	0.52	0.54	0.01	-0.02	91%	94%
OECD Asia Oceania	5.53	5.63	5.85	6.31	6.26	6.14	-0.12	0.45	85%	79%
OECD Total	36.40	35.32	36.76	38.35	36.90	36.31	-0.59	1.41	85%	81%

¹ US includes US50, OECD Americas include Chile and US territories.

² OECD Asia Oceania includes Israel, and Other OECD Europe includes Lithuania.


³ Utilisation rate calculations are based on total feed intake for some OECD countries and may therefore exceed stated crude processing capacities.

OECD Americas 1Q26 crude runs averaged 19.5 mb/d, up 840 kb/d y-o-y. This represents the highest first-quarter processing rate in at least 20 years and an average utilisation rate of 88% during what is typically the weakest quarter of the year. The availability of cheap crude, the arrival of Venezuelan crude cargoes, healthy refining margins and strong demand for refined product exports have combined to support processing rates. Despite the loss of refining capacity that has capped West Coast crude runs at close to 1.9 mb/d, strong US Gulf Coast (USGC) throughputs are nearly 400 kb/d ahead of prior year levels and comparable to peak summer run rates. In part, this may reflect debottlenecking projects that have been reported in recent months. Mexican runs rebounded to 1.2 mb/d in February, following January's 150 kb/d m-o-m dip from the 10-year high reached last December.



OECD Europe crude runs fell further in February, by 220 kb/d m-o-m to 11 mb/d. The impact of unplanned outages was evident in Spanish data, which fell 160 kb/d y-o-y following a fire at Repsol's 220 kb/d Cartagena refinery. Elsewhere, work to rebuild damaged crude processing capacity at Hungary's 140 kb/d Százhalombatta curtailed throughputs to 69 kb/d, a twenty-year low. March


crude throughput rates are estimated to have increased marginally, with further limited gains in April, as margins were strongly positive for sweet crude processing.



However, the loss of Middle East crude supplies has forced Asian refineries to substantially increase purchases of Mediterranean, West African and USGC crude cargoes in recent weeks. The increased competition for Atlantic Basin supplies has significantly curtailed the availability of prompt supplies and compressed margins. This may herald reduced throughputs in May. Thereafter, the resumption of Gulf exports will likely see a gradual normalisation of regional crude runs.

Having started the year strongly, **OECD Asia Oceania** crude runs are expected to slump in the coming weeks to reach a 2Q26 low point of 5.2 mb/d in May. Refineries in Japan and Korea face substantial challenges in securing sufficient crude supplies, given their heavy reliance on Middle East exports, which accounted for nearly 80% of crude imports in 2025. Across Asia, refiners' purchases of replacement barrels are being sourced from the furthest corners of the Atlantic Basin.

The recent collective action by IEA member states has provided a much-needed injection of additional barrels to plug the hole in the regional supply chain. Assuming that refineries are able to secure replacement cargoes for 60% of the lost crude imports, then regional industry inventory cover is manageable. This assumes that in addition to the already announced 67 mb of government crude stocks that will be made available across the region, Japan releases the additional 35 mb of government crude stock over the balance of 2Q26. The pressure on product supply will also be eased by release to the market of the 26 mb of products already held by the industry.




Non-OECD refinery activity

Non-OECD crude throughput forecasts have been cut further this month as we extend the assumption that disruptions to transiting the Strait of Hormuz continue until the end of April and slow

the pace of recovery across much of 2Q26. March non-OECD crude runs estimates are 790 kb/d lower than last month's *Report* at 43.4 mb/d. Middle East throughputs are now estimated at 7 mb/d for March, 250 kb/d above last month's *Report*. Conversely, non-OECD Asian crude runs estimates have been reduced by 1 mb/d, largely driven by more rapid run cuts, such as Sinopec's decision to slow activity by 600 kb/d for the month.

US sanctions waivers have been issued by the US Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control for Russian and Iranian supplies that were already on the water. This easing of restrictions has enabled Indian, Chinese and other refiners to significantly boost purchases of these grades. Similarly, the Chinese government has issued an additional 55 Mt (405 mb) of crude import quotas to independent refineries that expire within 30 days of the announcement of a ceasefire, leaving refiners no time to snap up additional supplies after the accord of 10 April. Nevertheless, the more prolonged supply outages that underpin this *Report*, as well as the increased long-term outages envisaged for the Middle East, lowers our 2026 forecast by an average of 1.3 mb/d from last month's estimate.


Middle East crude runs continue to bear the brunt of the short-term impact from the conflict in the Gulf. Throughput estimates for 2Q26 have been revised down by 1.8 mb/d from last month's *Report*. The later restart and more gradual recovery in refinery activity reflects the increased damage to regional refining capacity. Furthermore, forecast 2H26 Middle East crude runs are lowered by 1 mb/d to reflect the long-term damage to several refineries, including Bahrain's Sitra, Kuwait's Mina Al Ahmadi, the UAE's Ruwais and Saudi Arabia's SATORP.



Other Asia 2Q26 crude runs are cut by a further 270 kb/d to 9.7 mb/d. Thereafter, we assume that the gradual normalisation of crude exports avoids the worst inventory drawdown scenarios and results in limited impacts to crude runs. Failure to restart crude exports over the course of May and June would precipitate much more severe run cuts in the region with knock-on impacts to regional product supply.

Chinese crude throughput data for January and February were 430 kb/d ahead of forecast, at 15.2 mb/d, supported by strong domestic demand. However, the prospects for crude runs in 2Q26 are more mixed. Sinopec's announcement of a 600 kb/d run cut in March is likely to be extended into 2Q26. Recent crude price increases have cut into profitability of selling fuels domestically. Furthermore, reports that the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) has blocked exports of refined products beyond Hong Kong and Macao and instructed refineries to prioritise domestic supply of products, place independent refineries in a difficult position.

Rising onshore Chinese crude stocks during March reflect strong imports ahead of the start of the conflict and the government's reluctance to release strategic reserves despite the hiatus in Middle Eastern supplies. The release of an additional 55 Mt of crude import quotas offers some refineries a lifeline but at a cost. Reports indicate that refineries which do not maintain crude runs in the current difficult situation will receive reduced 2027 crude import quotas. Similarly, the Chinese government has reported authorised state oil companies to tap into commercial reserves they hold on behalf of the government, providing them with a further option to manage open market purchases of crude.




Forecasts for Eurasian crude runs are also reduced for 2Q26, following an intensification of attacks on Russian refineries. Reported crude runs reached multi-month highs in early March, before a series of crippling drone strikes across Russia from Kirishi in the West to Nizhny Novgorod in the centre of the country reduced runs by 600 kb/d to around 4.6 mb/d. Russian refineries have become more adept at repairing units quickly and we assume that while April runs are heavily affected, these units will return to service over the course of 2Q26.

Product cracks and refinery margins


March product prices and cracks diverged dramatically across products and regions. Middle distillate cracks spiked following the closure of the Strait of Hormuz. Conversely, fuel oil, naphtha and gasoline markets posted far more muted price movements. Underlying physical tightness and reliance on Middle East exports for the marginal barrel by importing regions explain this dichotomy.

Crude and product pricing has had to adjust to numerous shocks in recent weeks, with market participants at times comparing the pricing environment as akin to the depths of the 2007-2009 global financial crisis, if not worse. Market liquidity has deteriorated as historic pricing relationships have collapsed or been reversed. Two examples, among many, that exemplify the severe volatility and dislocation of pricing relationships that market participants have had to adapt to are Dubai's pricing relative to North Sea Dated and the jet fuel and diesel regrade in Singapore.

Over the past 30 years Dubai has traded on average at a \$2/bbl discount to North Sea Dated. The rare occasions that Dubai pricing dislocates from North Sea Dated are linked to times of significant stress in oil markets. At the peak uncertainty of the Covid pandemic in March 2020 the spread reached +\$7/bbl, while in the depths of the global financial crisis it reached +\$5/bbl. In March, the spread moved to a staggering \$50/bbl premium, implying a move of 25 standard deviations to historic norms. Similarly, the price spread between jet fuel and diesel in Singapore has averaged \$18/t over the past five years. In March, the spread moved from +\$800/t to -\$370/t in early April.




Source: Argus Media Group.




Source: IEA analysis based on data from Argus Media Group.

The difference between markets more directly affected by the Strait's closure and those relatively unscathed has been striking. Pre-war, global middle distillate markets were already showing fundamental tightness with sustained high product cracks and strong open arbitrage values to attract cargoes to Europe and other import dependent markets. This tightness had increased in recent quarters, following last year's robust demand growth and unplanned supply outages, including from Kuwait's Al Zour refinery following a fire. Middle distillate markets rely on Middle East export refineries for a significant share of the globally traded volumes for jet fuel, and to a lesser extent diesel. Pricing dislocations have consequently been extensive.

Conversely, global gasoline markets that do not rely on the Middle East as a key source of supply have seen much smaller dislocations. Indeed, with crude prices rallying in recent weeks, gasoline cracks against cash crude prices have fallen to record lows in Europe and Asia. Naphtha cracks also collapsed, as Asian demand tumbled in the face of widespread negative steam cracker ethylene margins. This capped naphtha prices at less than \$120/bbl. The recent collapse in Dubai pricing, below its historic relationship to other crude benchmarks, flipped cracks back to positive territory.




Source: IEA analysis based on data from Argus Media Group.




Source: IEA analysis based on data from Argus Media Group.


Middle distillate cracks led the rally in March, gaining around \$40/bbl in Asia, when assessed against Dubai delivered into Singapore. European jet fuel cracks posted a \$64/bbl m-o-m increase, to average \$90/bbl during the month, outpacing all other grades and regions. The pull on USGC diesel and jet fuel exports lifted cracks by \$30-45/bbl as volumes surged to five-year highs based on weekly EIA data for diesel and close to all-time highs for jet fuel.



Gasoline cracks diverged in March, with USGC up by \$8/bbl m-o-m, European cracks stable and Asian values collapsing in the face of rallying Dubai crude prices. Early April saw European and Asian cracks swap roles, as North Sea Dated rallied and Dubai prices sagged. Gasoline pricing was consistent with existing and emerging product trade flows. European markets rely on exports to Africa and the Americas to absorb the region’s surplus production. For now, these markets have not experienced shortfalls in product supply, although European exports are reported to be heading to East Africa in greater volumes. Conversely, Asia-Pacific gasoline markets remain heavily reliant on exports from China (now blocked), Singapore (subject to run cuts) and Korea (exports limited to prior year levels). Consequently, Singapore gasoline cracks may remain supported by the pull from ASEAN nations.




Source: IEA analysis based on data from Argus Media Group.




Source: IEA analysis based on data from Argus Media Group.

Naphtha cracks weakened as petrochemical buyers balked at the higher prices and cut processing rates to limit losses until ethylene prices adjusted to the feedstock supply disruptions. European and

Asian cracks led the move lower in response to the soaring Dubai values. European cracks slumped over the course of the month and dropped heavily in early April as North Sea Dated rallied above \$140/bbl. Only limited support was evident from gasoline blending economics, although arguably this was more visible for USGC heavy naphtha cracks, which rely primarily on naphtha reforming economics and direct blending.



Jet fuel cracks gained across the board in March, with price volatility at unprecedented levels. Asian cracks initially led the move higher, but Europe is the region with the greatest import dependence on the Middle East (see Box, *European Jet Fuel Markets Scramble for Cover*). Surging exports from the USGC provide only a partial offset, with few alternative sources of supply. Notwithstanding the current \$200/t incentive for refineries to maximise jet fuel production versus diesel, and the \$550/t versus naphtha, many refiners were already operating in max-jet production mode, leaving little room to boost yields. Restraints to raising output stretch to tight product specification (notably jet fuel's flash point), hydrotreating capacity limitations, tankage, and feedstock constraints.



European Jet Fuel Markets Scramble for Cover


The loss of Middle East jet fuel/kerosene exports has thrown a proverbial wrench into the inner workings of the aviation fuel markets. Global jet fuel/kerosene demand averaged 7.8 mb/d in 2025, with international trade providing around 2 mb/d of importing nations' needs. Gulf exports were the

largest source of jet fuel supplies to the global market, averaging nearly 400 kb/d, or 20% of total trade, closely followed by export-orientated refineries in Korea, India and China, who are themselves highly dependent on Middle Eastern crude imports. The loss of these supplies has complicated resupply options and our current global crude runs forecast of a decline of 1 mb/d y-o-y in 2026 effectively translates into an additional net 200 kb/d reduction in global jet fuel supply versus pre-conflict levels. The impact will be concentrated in 2Q26, when output drops by as much as 500 kb/d.

Chief among the importing regions that rely on the Middle East is OECD Europe. Regional demand of 1.6 mb/d was met last year by domestic production of 1.1 mb/d and net imports of 500 kb/d. The Middle East has typically supplied up to 375 kb/d, or 75%, of Europe's net jet fuel imports.


Net imports have been rising in recent years, as consumption has continued to grow and refinery capacity has been shut post-Covid. Furthermore, deliveries are highly seasonal, peaking over the summer holiday season. Winter months see heating-related kerosene demand boost volumes, however jet fuel use accounts for 95% of Europe's total demand.

Late 2025 saw Middle Eastern supply disruptions following a fire at Kuwait's Al Zour refinery, forcing Europe to source additional volumes from Korea, the United States, China and India. European inventories nevertheless declined, ending December 7% lower y-o-y at 52.7 mb, while forward inventory cover fell by 10% y-o-y to 37 days.



Concerns over European jet fuel supply availabilities have increased since the start of the conflict. The European Airports' industry association, (ACI Europe) stated in a letter to the European Commission on 10 April that a "systemic" jet fuel shortage is set to become a reality for the EU if the Strait isn't opened within the next three weeks.

Moreover, the regional average masks substantial national variations. European countries have vastly different proportions of domestic production versus imports and levels of inventory cover. The six largest consumers of jet fuel – the United Kingdom, Germany, France, Spain, Türkiye and Italy – collectively supply 63% of their 1.1 mb/d of demand from domestic production. It should be noted however, that while Spain is a net exporter of jet fuel, the United Kingdom – the region's largest consumer – imports 65% of its needs. Taking the end-December 2025 stock position, some countries hold several months' worth of inventory cover, while a number of large consumers rely on less than 20 days of stock cover, even though they are net importers.




As European markets approach the peak demand season, the loss of Middle East imports presents a severe logistical challenge. Weekly data for the Amsterdam Rotterdam Antwerp (ARA) area show that inventories plunged to the bottom of the five-year range in early April, having been above the five-year range in early February. The ARA is key to supplying jet fuel to a large part of Northwest European markets via pipelines and barge traffic on the Rhine.


Considering the inventory level in terms of days forward demand, we forecast that on average stocks in OECD Europe typically fall from 37-38 days at the start of the year to around 30 by mid-year. Post 2020, stocks have never dropped below 29 days cover. We assume that the European jet fuel supply system has a cushion of 20% in its operating stocks. This means that if cover were to drop below 23 days of inventory, physical shortages may emerge at select airports, resulting in flight cancellations, and demand destruction.

Scenarios mapping out Europe's success in replacing the lost Middle East volumes illustrate how quickly the system may reach a point where there are insufficient physical stocks.


- Assuming Europe manages to replace all of its Middle East imports and volumes then stocks will adequately cover our assessment of 2026 demand. However, inventory cover will end the year below the historic range, possibly heralding problems for 2027.
- If Europe manages to replace 90% of Middle East imports, then the region's stock cover will likely still fall below the typical seasonal low point but should prove adequate to meet the summer season peak demand. However, there appears to be only a limited ability to rebuild stocks into year-end and the region could end the year at only 26 days cover, well below what would typically be considered a tight inventory cover level.
- Less encouraging would be if Europe is only able to replace 75% of its Middle East volumes on a net basis. Under such a scenario it seems likely that there would be insufficient inventory to meet demand in summer months, with cover dropping below the 23-day level that we think likely heralds problems by August.
- Lastly, if the global jet fuel market tightens further and European markets are unable to secure more than 50% of their lost Middle East volumes, then stocks will hit the crucial 23-day level in June.



Diesel cracks rallied by \$38/bbl on average in Europe and Singapore, while USGC cracks gained \$30/bbl m-o-m. In addition to the loss of Middle Eastern exports, the ban on Chinese exports tightened Asian markets. Similarly, Russian export flows were reduced by the end-March attacks on key diesel export infrastructure, including the Kirishi refinery. Lastly, the fire and destruction of a diesel hydrotreater at Valero’s 380 kb/d Port Arthur refinery tightened USGC markets.




Source: IEA analysis based on data from Argus Media Group.




Source: IEA analysis based on data from Argus Media Group.

European refineries have the potential to raise diesel output, but planned maintenance, increased competition for crude supplies by Asian refineries and the incentive to maximise jet fuel will all weigh on output in the coming months.

High sulphur (HSFO), low sulphur (LSFO) and very low sulphur fuel oil (VLSFO) cracks were pressured lower in Europe and Asia by the rally in their respective benchmark crude prices. Singapore HSFO cracks slumped against Dubai for much of March, while LSFO cracks in Europe collapsed in early April when North Sea Dated spiked. Conversely, USGC fuel oil cracks managed a small increase, as prices matched the relatively limited crude price gains in the USGC.



Source: IEA analysis based on data from Argus Media Group.



Source: IEA analysis based on data from Argus Media Group.

Refinery margins

Refining margins rallied across the board in March, despite sharply higher crude prices in Asia. On paper, monthly average Northwest Europe margins reached record highs, eclipsing 2022's post-Ukraine invasion levels. A similar pattern was evident in Asian sweet crude margins, while the late-March collapse in Dubai pricing structure similarly boosted profitability for those Asian refiners processing sour crude to record levels. Refiners running sweet crude in the region also achieved record margins (based on WTI CFR Singapore). The relatively modest increase in crude prices (WTI gained \$28/bbl m-o-m on average) fell well short of the \$80-100/bbl increases in jet fuel and diesel in March.

However, in reality most cash crude differentials have soared as refineries facing the loss of Middle East crudes bid up alternative supplies. Grades that typically price within cents of regional benchmarks are now trading at premiums of \$10/bbl or more in Europe, West Africa and Latin America. Early April saw the publication of the bellwether Saudi Aramco OSP differentials for May loading cargoes of Arab Light for Asian customers increased by \$17/bbl to a premium of \$19.50/bbl against the average Oman/Dubai price. European buyers of Arab Light received a \$25/bbl increase in the differential versus ICE Brent futures to \$27.85/bbl. Consequently, this *Report's* refinery margins likely overstate the profitability that most refineries will be able to achieve.



Furthermore, outsized margin gains were not universal. Building crude market tightness has pressured refinery profitability, as has the volatility in day-to-day price movements. These are being elevated by the lack of market depth and pricing liquidity constraints that have impacted reported profitability.

IEA Global Indicator Refining Margins										
\$/bbl	Monthly Average				Change Feb - Mar	Average for week starting:				
	Dec 25	Jan 26	Feb 26	Mar 26		09 Mar	16 Mar	23 Mar	30 Mar	06 Apr
NW Europe										
Light sweet hydroskimming	4.34	0.81	1.46	15.20	13.73	16.55	19.74	12.63	1.86	-6.45
Light sweet cracking	7.59	3.94	5.33	23.17	17.83	23.52	29.06	21.94	12.41	3.63
Light sweet cracking + Petchem	7.81	4.31	5.68	23.32	17.64	23.75	29.10	22.21	12.76	4.35
Medium sour cracking	6.61	2.94	6.24	14.45	8.21	16.65	16.88	9.06	-0.64	-10.78
Medium sour cracking + Petchem	7.04	3.56	6.85	14.82	7.97	17.11	17.11	9.63	0.04	-9.59
US Gulf Coast										
Light sweet cracking	9.82	9.01	10.47	26.99	16.52	22.93	32.31	32.95	24.27	21.31
Medium sour cracking	9.93	9.65	9.87	19.30	9.43	16.30	26.98	24.08	11.58	14.97
Heavy sour coking	13.67	14.88	16.20	32.18	15.99	26.77	36.52	40.37	41.12	38.30
Singapore										
Light sweet cracking	5.23	2.87	2.73	42.12	39.40	37.55	52.62	54.04	57.47	36.01
Light sweet cracking + Petchem	5.93	3.37	2.42	40.34	37.92	36.06	50.64	52.29	55.59	35.89
Medium sour cracking	4.60	4.61	3.38	10.77	7.40	8.15	-5.18	14.26	52.74	38.14
Medium sour cracking + Petchem	7.52	7.26	5.34	14.59	9.25	11.64	-0.98	19.48	59.25	44.43

Note: Mediterranean and US Midcontinent margins are available in Table 15 of this Report.
 Source: IEA/Argus Media Group prices.
 Methodology notes are available at <https://www.iea.org/reports/oil-market-report-April-2026#methodology>


The balance of the second quarter will see fresh challenges for Asian refineries with the last Gulf crude cargoes that sailed in late February now having discharged. Similarly, the cushion provided by oil on water is already being absorbed into stocks. Refineries will now need to secure additional supplies, and competition for crude cargoes will intensify the longer the Strait remains closed. Moreover, with crude and product markets still exhibiting extremely strong levels of backwardation, their ability to capture the margins potentially on offer will test their risk management capabilities and systems.

Northwest European margins reached record levels in March when assessed against North Sea Dated, driven higher by the rally in middle distillate cracks. Gains on running light sweet crudes handily beat sour crude profitability. The near \$15/bbl rally in Johan Sverdrup cash differentials versus North Sea Dated during March weighed on the grade's profitability. Mediterranean margins have also suffered as local crude differentials soared.




As noted last month, **USGC** and **US Midcontinent** refining margins remain relatively insulated from the dislocations present in international crude and product markets. The release of US SPR barrels and increased Venezuelan extra heavy crude supplies to the USGC has undermined WCS crude

pricing. Consequently, USGC and Midcontinent coking refineries profitability has returned to, and briefly exceeded, the elevated levels last seen in 2022. However, with Asian buyers now snapping up US crude supplies, the coming weeks may see tighter crude markets weigh on USGC margins.




Source: IEA analysis based on data from Argus Media Group.




Source: IEA analysis based on data from Argus Media Group.

Singapore sweet crude margins, when assessed against WTI CFR Singapore, have reached record levels of around \$60/bbl in early April. However, competing sweet crude grades available to Asian refineries, such as Tapis, Cossack and Miri, are priced around \$20-25/bbl higher than the assessed WTI price. Consequently, it seems evident that while margins are extremely strong on paper, securing sufficient crude to continue operations is probably the greater challenge at the moment.

Estimated sour crude margins – based on Dubai – also likely overstate the true level of profitability. The recently announced Saudi Arabian OSP differential of +\$28/bbl versus the average of Dubai and Oman for May loading crude cargoes has lifted almost all of the Middle Eastern term supplies to significantly more expensive levels than Dubai. In common with other regions, the sharp backwardation evident in crude markets will force refineries to minimise operational stocks and make hard choices between paying up for prompt crude, drawing crude inventories or cutting runs.



Source: IEA analysis based on data from Argus Media Group.




Source: IEA analysis based on data from Argus Media Group.

Stocks

Overview

Global observed oil inventories fell by 85 mb in March, with stocks outside of the Middle East Gulf drawn down by a significant 205 mb (-6.6 mb/d). Oil on water plunged by 107 mb (-3.4 mb/d) as the effective closure of the Strait of Hormuz reduced oil in transit by 181 mb (-5.8 mb/d), while floating storage of crude and oil products in the Middle East rose by 100 mb (+3.2 mb/d) and onshore crude stocks in the region were up by 20 mb (+660 kb/d). China continued to add crude oil to tanks in March, at around 40 mb, but stocks in other non-OECD countries dipped by a cumulative 37 mb, with the Asia Pacific region seeing the biggest declines. Available data for OECD inventories for March were limited at the time of writing. Within these broader trends, middle distillate stocks, including diesel and jet fuel/kerosene, have tightened markedly due to the loss of exports from the Middle East Gulf and run cuts across refineries in Asia.



At the time of writing, 171 mb of oil was stored in tankers in the Gulf based on data from *Kpler*, while onshore crude stocks in the region were measured at 262 mb, according to *Kayros* satellite data. While ceasefire negotiations remain unclear, it will take time for tankers to reach consumers in Asia, Europe and beyond, but these Middle East oil stocks could play a key role in balancing the market in the coming months. In addition, the pace of emergency stocks releases by IEA member countries as part of the 400 mb collective action are expected to pick up from April through May (see *IEA Collective Action Will Continue to Provide Market Relief*).


In February, before the Gulf war, global oil inventories edged 3.2 mb lower, their first decline since January 2025, to 8 185 mb. Onshore stocks rose by 18 mb, as a 29 mb stock build in the non-OECD, led by Chinese crude (+26 mb), more than offset a draw of 10 mb in OECD countries. Oil on water dropped for the first time in six months, by 22 mb, with crude oil down 13 mb and products 9 mb lower.

IEA Collective Action will Continue to Provide Market Relief

Following the announcement of the largest ever coordinated stock release in IEA history on 11 March, member countries have made available large volumes of emergency oil stocks by offering government-controlled stocks to refiners, traders and oil suppliers via loans or sales as well as by lowering industry stockholding obligations. The timeframe for making oil available to the market varies across IEA member countries, depending on national circumstances.

Once made available, the uptake and flow of these stocks is determined by market demand. In the case of lowering industry obligations, the volumes instantly become a part of commercial inventories following government decisions to allow their use. In the case of government stocks, flows from strategic storage will depend on industry participants' decisions to take stocks offered from government reserves and are subject to logistics and delivery schedules.

Emergency stocks made available through 11 March IEA collective action




Since 11 March, a number of countries commenced releasing government-controlled stocks. In the United States, contracts have been awarded for around 55 mb of a total of 96 mb offered through two Requests for Proposal (RFPs) for crude oil loans from the Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR). The release of these stocks began in the final week of March and is expected to continue through April. A third RFP for an additional 30 mb was issued on 9 April with bids being accepted through 13 April.

In Asia, the release of government-controlled stocks is also ongoing. In Japan, the release 54 mb of government stocks committed to the IEA collective action commenced in late March and will continue over April. On 10 April, Japan announced an intention to release of an additional 20 days (approximately 35 mb) of oil from government stocks; the volumes from this announcement will likely begin to flow in May. Some European countries have already released government stocks and additional volumes are expected to be offered in April and May.

In addition to the release of government stocks, 73 mb of oil has been made available through the lowering of industry stockholding obligations in IEA countries in Europe and Asia Oceania. Up to 46 mb of oil could be made available by further lowering obligations through end-May.

Emergency oil stocks from IEA countries are providing significant relief to an oil market facing a substantial loss of supply. However, market demand will continue to be the key factor determining the volume and timing of the stock releases.

OECD commercial inventories in February drew by 10 mb to 2 795 mb, covering 64.1 days of forward demand. The smaller-than-seasonally normal draw on the month was mainly driven by modest declines in OECD Americas (-5.6 mb) and a counter-seasonal build in Europe (+3.4 mb), while Asia Oceania saw a 7.9 mb decline. Following these movements, only stocks in the Americas remained above year-ago levels whereas inventories in Europe was down 10.5 mb y-o-y and Asia Oceania was unchanged from the previous year.



February OECD industry crude oil stocks built by 21.3 mb to slightly below its year ago level (-4.1 mb y-o-y), mainly due to the Americas (+19.2 mb) and Europe (+4.5 mb). Asia Oceania drew counter-seasonally by 2.4 mb. By contrast, commercial oil product stocks declined by a combined 32 mb, with decreases across all products. Gasoline stocks eased by 6.4 mb, led by the Americas (-6.5 mb), but nevertheless held their highest February level in seven years. Middle distillates dipped by 6.3 mb, at only half their seasonal norm, while European stocks rose by a counter-seasonal 3 mb. The Americas and Asia Oceania drew by 6.4 mb and 2.9 mb, respectively. Fuel oil declined counter-seasonally, by 1.7 mb, due to a draw in Europe. 'Other products' dipped by 17.5 mb but remained at historical highs for February.

	February 2026 (preliminary)				Fourth Quarter 2025							
	(million barrels)				(million barrels per day)							
	Americas	Europe	Asia Oceania	Total	Americas	Europe	Asia Oceania	Total	Americas	Europe	Asia Oceania	Total
Crude Oil	19.2	4.5	-2.4	21.3	0.7	0.2	-0.1	0.8	0.0	-0.2	0.1	-0.1
Gasoline	-6.5	0.3	-0.2	-6.4	-0.2	0.0	0.0	-0.2	0.2	0.0	0.0	0.2
Middle Distillates	-6.4	3.0	-2.9	-6.3	-0.2	0.1	-0.1	-0.2	0.0	-0.1	0.0	-0.1
Residual Fuel Oil	0.5	-2.2	0.0	-1.7	0.0	-0.1	0.0	-0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Other Products	-14.0	-3.5	-0.1	-17.5	-0.5	-0.1	0.0	-0.6	-0.3	0.0	-0.1	-0.4
Total Products	-26.4	-2.4	-3.2	-32.0	-0.9	-0.1	-0.1	-1.1	0.0	-0.1	-0.1	-0.3
Other Oils ¹	1.6	1.4	-2.3	0.6	0.1	0.0	-0.1	0.0	-0.1	0.0	0.0	-0.1
Total Oil	-5.6	3.4	-7.9	-10.0	-0.2	0.1	-0.3	-0.4	-0.1	-0.3	0.0	-0.5

¹ Other Oils includes NGLs, feedstocks and other hydrocarbons.

OECD industry stocks in January were revised lower by 14.8 mb upon the submission of more complete data by member countries. Americas and Europe adjusted their crude stocks by -9.4 mb and -8 mb, respectively, while Asia Oceania saw a marginal 1.5 mb upgrade. NGLs and feedstocks were also lowered in the Americas (-7 mb) and Europe (-1.4 mb). By contrast, total oil product stocks were revised up by 9.4 mb, led by the 'other products' category which includes LPG, and middle distillates. OECD total inventories for December were also revised down, by 12.7 mb, for crude, NGLs and feedstocks in the Americas (-6.2 mb) and European total products (-6.8 mb).

OECD Industry Stock Revisions versus March 2026 Oil Market Report

(million barrels)

	Americas		Europe		Asia Oceania		OECD	
	Dec-25	Jan-26	Dec-25	Jan-26	Dec-25	Jan-26	Dec-25	Jan-26
Crude Oil	-1.9	-9.4	0.0	-8.0	0.0	1.5	-1.9	-15.9
Gasoline	0.0	0.2	-4.2	-1.8	0.0	0.7	-4.1	-0.9
Middle Distillates	0.3	1.3	0.0	3.4	0.0	1.2	0.2	5.9
Residual Fuel Oil	0.0	0.7	-4.1	-3.5	0.0	-0.4	-4.1	-3.2
Other Products	0.0	5.3	1.6	2.9	0.0	-0.6	1.6	7.6
Total Products	0.3	7.6	-6.8	1.0	0.0	0.9	-6.4	9.4
Other Oils ¹	-4.3	-7.0	0.0	-1.4	0.0	0.0	-4.3	-8.3
Total Oil	-5.9	-8.8	-6.8	-8.4	0.0	2.4	-12.7	-14.8

¹ Other Oils includes NGLs, feedstocks and other hydrocarbons.

Implied balance

Global observed inventories plunged by 2.7 mb in March, as the war in the Middle East caused widespread disruptions to oil supply, exports and refinery activity. The draws hide divergent developments, as the Middle East Gulf saw large inventory builds while the rest of the world suffered substantial draws. Similarly, product stocks have drawn as weakening product demand lags the drop of refinery activity, aggravated by the loss of Hormuz product flows. The near halt to flows through the Strait of Hormuz drove large Middle East Gulf stock builds in March both on land (+660 kb/d) and on the water (+3.2 mb/d). Outside the region, on-land crude stocks were up by 730 kb/d in March as China's build of 1.3 mb/d left other non-Middle East stocks drawing overall (-550 kb/d). Oil on water outside the Gulf drew heavily (-6.7 mb/d) on lost flows from the Strait and as cargoes continued to discharge. Steeper losses are expected in April.

IEA Global Oil Balance (implied stock change) (mb/d)													
	2023	2024	1Q25	2Q25	3Q25	Oct-25	Nov-25	Dec-25	4Q25	2025	Jan-26	Feb-26	Mar-26
Global oil balance	-0.36	-0.42	0.52	1.73	2.59	2.35	3.44	2.00	2.59	1.86	3.04	2.06	-4.49
Observed stock changes													
OECD industry stocks	-0.01	-0.06	-0.08	0.44	0.87	-1.28	0.36	-0.4	-0.46	0.19	-0.7	-0.4	0.20
OECD government stocks	-0.02	0.11	-0.01	-0.04	-0.03	0.00	0.18	0.2	0.12	0.01	0.0	0.0	-0.05
Non-OECD crude stocks*	0.05	0.10	-0.36	1.08	0.18	-0.48	1.66	0.5	0.56	0.37	1.7	1.0	0.75
of which, Chinese crude stocks	0.04	0.18	-0.33	0.93	0.20	-0.67	0.49	1.4	0.40	0.30	0.3	0.9	1.28
Selected non-OECD product stocks**	0.03	-0.03	0.14	-0.04	-0.14	0.12	0.00	-0.4	-0.10	-0.03	0.1	0.0	-0.18
Oil on water	-0.10	-0.23	0.79	-0.05	0.97	2.17	0.30	0.4	0.97	0.67	0.3	-0.8	-3.4
Total observed stock changes	-0.05	-0.12	0.48	1.39	1.85	0.52	2.51	0.3	1.09	1.21	1.4	-0.1	-2.7
of which, Crude	-0.17	-0.20	1.07	0.85	1.07	2.69	1.88	0.1	1.55	1.14	0.0	1.4	-0.63
Unaccounted for balance	-0.31	-0.29	0.04	0.34	0.74	1.83	0.93	1.7	1.50	0.66	1.6	2.2	-1.75

*Observed non-OECD crude stocks are from Kayros and include only above ground storage, adjusted NGLs from JODI, plus estimated data for South Africa's Saldanha Bay from Kpler.

**JODI data adjusted for monthly gaps in reporting, latest data for January 2026, plus Fujairah and Singapore inventories.

Sources: IEA, EIA, PAJ, Kayros, JODI, Kpler, FEDCom/S&P Global Platts and Enterprise Singapore.


In February, global observed inventories eased by a marginal 0.1 mb. Total non-OECD builds of 1 mb/d, of which almost 90% was Chinese crude, more than offset a 400 kb/d draw in OECD stocks and an 800 kb/d reduction in oil on water. The 'unaccounted-for balance' was an unusually large 2.2 mb/d for February at the time of writing. Typically, the discrepancy between apparent and observed stocks will diminish as more complete data for supply, demand and inventories become available.

Recent OECD industry stocks changes

OECD Americas

OECD Americas commercial inventories drew by a moderate 5.6 mb in February. At 1 522 mb, stocks were 68.9 mb above a year ago, covering 62.8 days of forward demand. The monthly decline was mainly due to the United States as Canadian stocks rose by 1.2 mb. Regional crude stocks jumped to a 10-month high, with 19.2 mb of combined builds from the United States (+17.7 mb) and Canada (+1.5 mb), while NGLs and feedstocks rose by a further 1.6 mb. US crude inventories recovered from a decade low for January, supported by the restoration of domestic supplies following the January disruption caused by the freezing winter storm and increased imports from both the Middle East and South America, according to *Kpler*.



Regional product stocks hit a historical high for February despite a 26.4 mb m-o-m decline. Gasoline dropped by 6.5 mb but stayed above the five-year range. Middle distillates fell by 6.4 mb, led by the United States. Fuel oil was up by 0.5 mb. US 'other products' declined by 14 mb, in line with their seasonal trend.



Preliminary weekly data from the EIA showed US commercial stocks built by 6.2 mb in March. At the same time, US oil exports to Asia Pacific region hit their highest level on record, according to *Kpler*. Crude oil stocks surged by 23.5 mb to a three-year high. Total product inventories declined by 15.2 mb, led by a 12.4 mb draw in gasoline and a 3.1 mb drop in middle distillates, while fuel oil and 'other products' were largely unchanged. Additionally, government stocks released in the final week of March underpinned a monthly 1.6 mb reduction in the Strategic Petroleum Reserve.

OECD Europe

In OECD Europe, industry stocks built counter-seasonally by 3.4 mb in February. At 936 mb, regional stocks were 10.5 mb below a year ago, covering 72.3 days. Crude stocks followed their five-year trend, increasing by 4.5 mb, with builds in the Netherlands (+4.6 mb), Italy (+2.6 mb) and Spain (+2 mb), while Sweden and Norway drew by 3.1 mb and 2.7 mb, respectively. Inventories in France and the United Kingdom hit record lows for February despite monthly builds.





Total products declined by 2.4 mb to year-ago levels. Middle distillates rose by 3 mb, thanks to Italy (+2.2 mb), Belgium (+1.3 mb) and Norway (+1.1 mb), while those in France fell to their lowest February level since 2008 due to a 1.9 mb decline. Fuel oil slid by 2.2 mb, driven by Sweden (-1.2 mb), the Netherlands (-0.5 mb) and Türkiye (-0.4 mb). ‘Other products’ fell back to year-ago levels due to declines in Belgium (-1.5 mb), Germany (-0.7 mb) and France (-0.6 mb). Gasoline stocks were largely unchanged (+0.3 mb) as reductions in Germany (-0.9 mb) and Italy (-0.8 mb) were offset by gains in Spain (+0.6 mb), Austria (+0.4 mb) and the United Kingdom (+0.3 mb).

Preliminary data showed European crude inventories stored in floating roof tanks rose by 4 mb in March, according to *Kayrros*. While stocks drew in Türkiye (-2.5 mb), Spain (-2.2 mb) and Germany (-1.7 mb), they built in the Netherlands (+4 mb), France and Poland (+3.5 mb each) and Italy (+1.1 mb).

OECD Asia Oceania

Commercial stocks in OECD Asia Oceania dropped by 7.9 mb in February. At 337 mb, they were in line with the previous year and covered 52.6 days of forward demand. Regional crude oil stocks declined counter-seasonally (-2.4 mb), led by Korea (-2.8 mb), while NGLs and feedstocks eased by 2.3 mb, mostly in Japan (-1.9 mb). Total products stocks drew by 3.2 mb, essentially due to a 3.1 mb decline in Japan’s middle distillates. Regional gasoline, fuel oil and ‘other products’ remained roughly flat from January.




According to weekly data from the *Petroleum Association of Japan*, Japan's crude, NGLs and feedstocks inventories drew by 11.7 mb m-o-m in March reflecting sharply lower imports from the Middle East. Oil products stocks data were unavailable as *PAJ* temporarily halted the publication of weekly oil product stocks data due to disruptions related to the war in the Middle East.


Other stocks developments

Oil on water dropped by 107 mb (-3.4 mb/d) to 1 897 mb in March, following February's 22 mb draw, according to *Kpler*. Oil in transit plunged by 181 mb (-5.8 mb/d), split by crude (-117 mb, or -3.8 mb/d) and products (-64 mb, or -2.1 mb/d) as exports from the Middle East Gulf came to a near standstill. By contrast, floating storage swelled by 74 mb (+2.4 mb/d) to its highest level since September 2020. Notably, floating crude rose by 55 mb overall as a 73 mb build in the Middle East was partly offset by lower volumes of sanctioned oil in the Asia Pacific. Moreover, a 20 mb of build of floating products was also led by the Middle East region (+26 mb).


Sanctioned oil on water dropped by 22 mb following a 11 mb reduction in February. Russian barrels in floating storage were reduced by 22 mb after the US Department of the Treasury Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) gave buyers permission to purchase Russian and Iranian oil on the water for 30 days.



Note: Oil on water includes floating storage and oil in transit. Source: *Kpler*.




Note: Sanctioned oil: Russia, Iran and Venezuela. Floating oil: Volumes of idling more than 12 days. Source: *Kpler*.




Source: *Kpler*.

Non-OECD crude stocks built in both February and March, but with divergent regional trends. In February, non-OECD crude stocks grew by 29 mb m-o-m, led by China (+25.6 mb). Among OPEC members, high exports from the Middle East before the outbreak of the war resulted in a 6.3 mb total decline. By contrast, crude stocks in Brazil climbed by 3.9 mb to the highest February level in six years. Russian observable onshore stocks built 3.5 mb to a record high. Total non-OECD crude stocks grew by a further 23 mb in March. However, the build was mainly in China (+39.6 mb) and Middle Eastern countries (+17.9 mb) as Gulf exports were halted. On the other hand, oil consuming

countries that rely on imports from the Gulf saw steep declines: Asia-Pacific shrank by 21.3 mb, mainly in India (-12 mb), followed by Africa (-7.3 mb), and South America including Caribbean countries (-3.6 mb).




Source: Kayrros.




Source: Kayrros.

Total oil products inventories in Fujairah dropped by a hefty 7.5 mb in March amid several attacks on their facilities and shipping disruptions, according to *FEDCom and S&P Global Platts*. The significant monthly reductions, following a 1.3 mb draw in February, took stocks to their lowest level since at least 2017. Reduced product imports underpinned a 3.7 mb decline in light distillates. Heavy distillates and residues also dropped by 2.9 mb to a record low. Middle distillates eased by 0.9 mb.

By contrast, oil products stocks in Singapore built by 1.8 mb in March, according to *Enterprise Singapore*. Middle distillates rose by 2.2 mb while residues were up by 0.7 mb. Light distillates fell by 1.1 mb, although they remained 2.1 mb above their five-year average.




Source: *FEDCom/S&P Global Platts*.



Source: *Enterprise Singapore*.

Regional OECD End-of-Month Industry Stocks (in days of forward demand and million barrels of total oil)




¹ Days of forward demand are based on average OECD demand over the next three months.

Prices

Overview

Oil prices posted their largest-ever monthly gain in March, as the US-Israeli military campaign against Iran triggered the most severe oil supply shock in history. North Sea Dated surged \$55/bbl from the start of the war by end-March, posting an average monthly gain of \$33/bbl m-o-m to \$103.84/bbl. Prices continued their ascent in April, with Dated rising as high as \$145/bbl, before briefly dipping after the United States and Iran agreed on 7 April to a two-week ceasefire subject to the immediate reopening of the Strait of Hormuz. However, the subsequent collapse of peace talks saw prices quickly rebounding and, at the time of writing, Dated was trading around \$130/bbl, almost \$30/bbl above average March levels.

Early April saw a marked deviation between headline futures and physical spot prices. Futures prices are trading more than \$30/bbl below spot market levels, with physical benchmark prices and differentials more immediately reflecting the acute supply tightness, as refiners scrambled frantically to replace Middle Eastern cargoes.



Disruptions to Middle Eastern shipping and oil flows worsened throughout March into early April as traffic through the Strait of Hormuz slowed to a crawl. With ships unable to load and storage tanks filling up, regional oil producers curtailed output. Additionally, numerous major oil and gas facilities across the Gulf sustained extensive damage from missile and drone strikes, including Qatar's giant Ras Laffan LNG hub. Disruptions elsewhere added to the supply pandemonium, as Ukraine stepped up its drone warfare against Russia's energy infrastructure, inflicting damage to the Baltic export hubs Primorsk and Ust-Luga, as well as to Novorossiysk in the Black Sea. In addition, the Houthis in Yemen resumed attacks on Israel, launching several barrages of ballistic missiles.

The oil market's focus oscillated between the potential for further escalation and the prospects of a possible ceasefire. Cut-off from Middle East barrels, refiners aggressively sought short-haul alternatives to maintain throughputs and meet demand. The sudden incremental call on available barrels jolted prices sharply higher, first in Asia and subsequently in the North Sea. Dated ended the month at \$126/bbl – a near-four year high – and rose further in early April after President Trump's address to the nation failed to provide a clear timeline for an end to the war. Prices plunged by \$20/bbl on 8 April after the United States and Iran agreed a two-week ceasefire but rebounded after subsequent negotiations faltered.

Abrupt scarcity in the segments of the oil market most sharply disrupted by the war triggered unprecedented moves in differentials, product cracks and calendar spreads. Prices for Middle Eastern crude benchmark Dubai more than doubled since the war started, trading at a \$50/bbl premium to Dated mid-month (compared to around parity before). Supply disruptions on some of the crude grades underlying its basket resulted in Dubai pricing largely off Oman, thereby severely curtailing its liquidity and undermining its aptness as a Middle Eastern benchmark.

In parallel, the war pushed oil tanker freight rates to record highs, with hundreds of vessels stuck in the Mideast Gulf. This weighed especially on WTI, with its discount to forward Dated in March reaching almost \$10/bbl in the week of 23 March. Within the product spectrum, middle distillates rallied (the Middle East is a key supplier of diesel and jet fuel to Europe and Asia), with Asian prices for diesel and jet fuel more than doubling in March. Time spreads soared deeply into backwardation, with the Brent first-week contract for difference ending the month at \$17/bbl before soaring to \$30/bbl in early April. The May-June time spread in ICE Brent expired at \$14/bbl on 31 March, with the M1-12 spread trading at \$42/bbl.

The war also drove pricing in wider financial markets, as soaring energy prices darkened the global economic climate, reviving stagflation concerns. The US dollar and long-dated bond yields were strongly positively correlated with oil prices throughout March, with stock market indices displaying negative correlation. Bond yields surged as rising oil and gas prices fuelled inflation concerns, with ten-year US Treasury yields up by 0.38% to 4.32% – a six-month high. European bond yields rallied in parallel amid concerns about the impact of the oil supply shock on the region's fragile public finances.

The Federal Reserve, European Central Bank and Bank of England all kept interest rates on hold at their March meetings as the Iran war clouded the economic outlook. Macro-economic data releases tilted bearish. Fourth-quarter US economic growth was revised down in March to an annualised rate of 0.7% from 1.4% previously, as consumer spending and business investment slowed. The US economy lost 92 000 jobs in February, but this was followed by a strong March jobs report (+178 000). Headline personal consumption expenditures (PCE) inflation was 2.8% y-o-y in January – the measure has now been above target for five years.

Crude Prices and Differentials (\$/bbl)								
	Month			Week of: 06 Apr	Last: 10 Apr	Changes Mar 26		
	Jan 2026	Feb 2026	Mar 2026			*Monthly Δ	m-o-m Δ	y-o-y Δ
Crude Futures (M1)								
NYMEX WTI	60.26	64.52	91.00	102.84	96.57	34.36	26.47	23.06
ICE Brent	64.73	69.37	99.60	100.98	95.20	45.87	30.23	28.13
Crude Marker Grades								
North Sea Dated	66.73	71.09	103.84	131.92	125.86	55.03	32.75	31.30
WTI (Cushing)	60.44	64.50	91.16	102.84	96.57	34.36	26.66	23.17
Dubai (London close)	62.82	68.69	128.20	108.27	99.92	64.01	59.51	55.85
Differential to North Sea Dated								
WTI (Cushing)	-6.29	-6.59	-12.67	-29.07	-29.29	-20.67	-6.09	-8.13
Dubai (London close)	-3.91	-2.40	24.37	-23.65	-25.94	8.98	26.76	24.55
Differential to ICE Brent								
North Sea Dated	2.00	1.72	4.24	30.93	30.66	9.16	2.52	3.16
NYMEX WTI	-4.47	-4.85	-8.60	1.86	1.37	-11.51	-3.76	-5.07

Sources: Argus Media Group, ICE, NYMEX (NYMEX WTI = NYMEX Light Sweet Crude).

*Monthly refers to the difference in price between the current and previous end of month.

Futures markets

ICE Brent crude futures rose by \$30/bbl m-o-m to \$99.60/bbl in March and were still trading around \$100/bbl in early April, as futures failed to keep pace with physical spot price benchmarks that were buoyed most immediately by the extreme market tightness and scrambled supply chains. Tehran's blocking of the Strait of Hormuz resulted in hundreds of misaligned ships, with around 400 tankers



stranded in the Gulf. WTI tracked Brent higher, but discounts widened on the prompt contract in the wake of soaring transatlantic freight rates and rising US inventories, in turn boosted by strong US crude imports.


Weekly data from the Energy Information Agency showed US crude inventories increasing by 5.1% to 461.6 mb in March, the highest since June 2023. Stocks at the key Cushing, Oklahoma storage hub rose throughout the month, by a cumulative 8.9% to 31.5 mb, the most since July 2024.

Front-month Brent moved by a daily average of \$4.48/bbl in March, the most since the Ukraine invasion, and traded far above its 50-, 100-, and 200-day moving averages.

Fund exchange positioning moved in tandem with prices. The long-to-short crude futures ratio held by money managers rose by two points to 4.9 mid-month, the highest in two years, before ending March at 4.3. This was almost two points above the long-term average and a far cry from the ultra-bearish positioning at the end of last year. The equivalent ratio for the products was 5.0, with holdings allocated evenly between distillates and gasoline.


Total open interest in the five main ICE and NYMEX futures decreased by 0.6% m-o-m to 6 470 mb.






Spot crude oil prices

Physical crude prices surged into April as the effective closure of the Strait of Hormuz removed sizeable volumes of Middle East Gulf crude and condensate from global markets. North Sea Dated soared by \$32.75/bbl m-o-m to average \$103.84/bbl, breaching \$144/bbl at its early April peak. WTI Cushing rose by \$26.66/bbl m-o-m to \$91.16/bbl, touching \$112/bbl first week of April. Dubai, the principal pricing benchmark for sour Mideast Gulf crude, jumped by \$30.50/bbl m-o-m to \$98.39/bbl, after reaching a high of \$167.62/bbl on 19 March. Dubai prices averaged a \$28/bbl premium to Brent in March as differentials between Middle Eastern and Atlantic Basin crudes jumped to record levels, underlining the severity of the Gulf shortage.



Source: Argus Media Group.




Source: Argus Media Group.

The disruption to flows through the Strait of Hormuz led to pronounced physical tightness, pushing crude market structures into extreme backwardation. Disruptions were staggered across different markets, with Asia and Dubai prices hit first before Brent and WTI were buoyed by Atlantic Basin tightness by end-March. The relationship between physical North Sea Dated and ICE Brent futures – a differential that normally trades within a narrow band – experienced the largest divergence on

record. The Dated-to-Brent spread averaged \$4.24/bbl in March, up \$2.52/bbl m-o-m, before surging to just over \$33/bbl in early April. At the same time, the North Sea Dated M1-M3 spread widened by \$9.02/bbl m-o-m to average \$10.26/bbl, reaching a peak of \$22/bbl on 31 March. This dislocation reflects a fundamental difference between the two pricing systems. North Sea Dated is anchored to the immediate availability of physical cargoes, whereas ICE Brent futures are liquid financial instruments for which there is no scarcity and whose pricing reflects broad fundamentals across the forward curve. When physical supply is severely curtailed, prompt physical prices can detach sharply from forward paper markets.


Similarly, Dubai M1-M3 backwardation averaged \$37.50/bbl, up a sharp \$36.59/bbl m-o-m, and peaking at \$66.55/bbl on 19 March – well above the previous high of just over \$9/bbl recorded in 2022. The widening reflected the massive loss of Middle East Gulf medium-sour exports, which forced Asian refiners to compete aggressively for limited prompt supply. Critically, the Dubai benchmark's dislocation was compounded by rule changes (See *Dubai Disconnects*) implemented by S&P Global Commodity Insights (Platts), Price Reporting Agency (PRA). By early April, Dubai retracted toward levels more consistent with its historical averages. The spread between Brent-Dubai Exchange of Futures for Swaps (EFS) – a closely watched measure of the East-West crude arbitrage – widened to an average of \$9.12/bbl in March, up \$7.40/bbl m-o-m, increasing to over \$17/bbl in early April, before narrowing.



In the North Sea, physical differentials reached record highs in March, surging further into April. The jump in prices reflected a combination of strong refining margins in Northwest Europe, sharply higher regional freight costs, and an imminent drop in supply from the Middle East. Sustained competition from Asian buyers for prompt cargoes, added further pressure. Against this backdrop, Forties strengthened by \$1.42/bbl m-o-m to average \$3.07/bbl, while Ekofisk and Oseberg firmed by \$3.10/bbl and \$3.13/bbl, respectively. Johan Sverdrup differentials rose by \$9.47/bbl m-o-m to \$7.06/bbl, as refiners sought medium-sour alternatives to disrupted Middle East Gulf supplies. WTI CIF Rotterdam also firmed, averaging \$4.70/bbl, up \$1.98/bbl m-o-m, and is currently at \$22.40 above the benchmark. In April, average differentials climbed to their highest at over \$22/bbl, well above the previous peak of just over \$10/bbl following the onset of the war in Ukraine.

West African crude differentials widened overall, though gains were more modest than in neighbouring North Sea grades, as soaring freight costs and steep backwardation in Northwest Europe weighed on buying economics. Even so, Forcados rose by \$0.86/bbl m-o-m to \$2.17/bbl, while Bonny Light gained \$0.78/bbl m-o-m to \$1.38/bbl and Qua Iboe and Brass River posted smaller increases. By April, Nigerian grades were trading more than \$5/bbl above North Sea Dated,


approaching differentials last seen following the onset of the Ukraine war, as Asian buyers absorbed available length in loading programmes. Angolan grades saw a sharper recovery toward the end of March, with Girassol rising by \$1.47/bbl m-o-m to \$0.60/bbl and Cabinda increasing by \$2.96/bbl m-o-m to \$1.51/bbl, with both grades reaching \$10/bbl on 31 March. These late-month gains reflected increased urgency among Asian buyers to secure supplies – particularly Chinese state-owned refiners – who stepped up purchases of April loading cargoes.




Mediterranean and Caspian crude differentials reached multi-year or record highs in March and April, as European and Asian refiners competed for a limited pool of regional supply, despite a sharp rise in freight costs, which increased by more than 20% over the final two weeks of the month. Algerian Saharan Blend strengthened by \$3.33/bbl m-o-m to \$4.37/bbl, reaching a record high of \$10.50/bbl versus Dated on 27 March. BTC Blend rose to \$7.53/bbl, and hit an \$18/bbl premium by 7 April, as Indian and Japanese refiners entered the market. CPC Blend firmed by \$2.43/bbl m-o-m, though it continued to trade at a discount to Dated (-\$6.48/bbl on average), still narrowing toward levels last seen in 1997. Meanwhile, Libya's Es Sider surged by \$5.13/bbl m-o-m to \$4.93/bbl and climbed to \$11.35/bbl versus Dated on 31 March – its highest premium since January 1990 – supported by operational disruptions following a pipeline fire on 18 March.

Russian export differentials were broadly stable relative to the scale of wider market movements. Rising freight costs absorbed much of the price strength that sellers might otherwise have captured at the FOB level, requiring wide discounts to be maintained in order to sustain buyer interest. At the same time, port disruptions from drone attacks in the Baltic and Black Sea limited exporters' ability to realise further gains. As a result, Urals FOB Primorsk averaged -\$28.33/bbl versus North Sea Dated, while Urals FOB Novorossiysk held at -\$28.24/bbl, both largely unchanged m-o-m. ESPO Blend discounts to Dated widened by \$1.50 to -\$18.50/bbl, while discounts to Dubai M1 deepened by \$29.01/bbl m-o-m to average -\$42.92/bbl, driven primarily by the sharp rally in Dubai outright prices rather than changes in ESPO-specific supply or demand fundamentals.

In the Middle East, grades loading outside the Strait of Hormuz commanded extraordinary premiums as buyers scrambled to secure barrels accessible outside the chokepoint. Oman, loading at Mina al-Fahal on the Gulf of Oman, surged by \$25.27/bbl m-o-m to an average premium of \$25.66/bbl versus Dubai, peaking at an all-time high of \$61.43/bbl on 19 March before retreating sharply as concerns about port security at Fujairah and Mina al-Fahal intensified. Murban, which predominantly loads at Fujairah outside the Strait, gained \$10.78/bbl m o m to \$12.47/bbl, hitting \$38.74/bbl on 23 March. Upper Zakum and Al-Shaheen, both loading inside the Gulf and for which production halted during the month, inched up notionally by \$0.53/bbl and \$0.29/bbl, respectively.




Source: Argus Media Group.




Source: Argus Media Group.

US Gulf Coast crude differentials were mixed in March. WTI Midland averaged \$1.44/bbl versus WTI Cushing, up \$0.86/bbl m-o-m, while WTI Houston averaged \$2.65/bbl, up \$1.55/bbl, with both strengthening further in early April to around \$4/bbl and \$6/bbl, respectively. The WTI Houston-Midland spread widened to a six-year high of over \$2/bbl, reflecting strong export-driven demand as Asia-Pacific buyers substitute US light-sweet crude for disrupted Middle East Gulf supplies. Medium-sour Mars strengthened sharply, rising by \$5.76/bbl m-o-m to average \$4.45/bbl, and reaching \$13.21/bbl by month-end, as global refiners sought alternatives to curtailed Middle East Gulf grades. By contrast, heavy-sour Canadian crudes weakened as the US SPR release programme diverted some Gulf Coast refiners away from Canadian barrels. WCS at Hardisty fell by \$1.32/bbl m-o-m to -\$16.63/bbl, after briefly trading near a -\$12/bbl discount in early March. The announcement of 45.2 mb awarded in the first phase of the US SPR releases added to price pressure from rising Canadian output. Elevated freight rates further dampened values for westbound barrels on the TMX system, with High-TAN FOB Vancouver prices falling by \$6.66/bbl to -\$18.95/bbl m-o-m, and \$25/bbl by early April.




Source: Argus Media Group.



Source: Argus Media Group.

Latin American differentials bifurcated sharply. Guyanese Liza soared by close to \$50/bbl over Brent as Asian and European buyers sought light sour barrels. Brazil's Búzios delivered CIF to Rotterdam rose by \$7.25/bbl m-o-m to \$9.44/bbl on average in March, before surging to more than \$46/bbl above Brent in early April, reflecting the extreme premium European buyers were paying for accessible Atlantic Basin supply. At the same time, Brazil Tupi ex-Shandong rose \$6.15/bbl to \$8.17/bbl m-o-m, with the spread widening to over \$18/bbl in early April. By contrast, FOB prices for


Colombia Castilla and Ecuador Oriente all moved sharply lower as the re-emergence of Venezuelan barrels onto the unsanctioned market added incremental heavy supply and freight costs made long-haul delivery increasingly challenging.




Dubai Disconnects

The March trading window produced what some market participants have described as the largest oil market position ever recorded in the Platts Market on Close (MOC) process. A total of 1 920 Dubai partials – each representing 25 000 barrels – were traded, resulting in 82 convergence cargoes of 500 000 barrels each, surpassing the previous record set in August 2015.

TotalEnergies' trading arm *Totsa* was the buyer of 77 of those cargoes, (or 94%, with Mercuria taking 4% and Equinor 1%) accumulating some 38.5 mb of Oman and Murban crudes. This concentration may have amplified upward pressure on Dubai pricing beyond the impact of physical scarcity. On 2 March, a methodological intervention from S&P Platts added to tensions when they cut deliverable grades into the pricing process from five to the two grades loading outside the Strait – Murban at Fujairah and Oman at Mina al-Fahal. This reduced the deliverable basket by roughly 30%. On the other hand, on 20 March, Platts suspended the Murban quality adjustment (a



discount) which boosted physical deliveries into the pricing process, helping preserve benchmark liquidity. Oman and Murban premiums to Dubai reached all-time highs of \$53.34/bbl and \$38.74/bbl, respectively, on 19 and 23 March.




In a typical month, Dubai prices approximately 14 mb/d of Middle East crude supply, usually averaged with Oman as part of a monthly index. In March that volume fell to around 5.5 mb/d, including exports from Saudi Arabia to Asia via Yanbu (3.7 mb/d) and from Iran (1.8 mb/d). Beyond valuing cargoes, assessed Dubai prices can be used in some cases for theoretical margin accounting, mark-to-market valuations on related paper hedges and in credit facility calculations when purchasing Middle Eastern crude. As Dubai pricing eased in early April, Brent prices surged with extreme tightness developing in the North Sea, underlining the current market sensitivity to physical availability of cargoes. The episode has prompted Asian refiners to request that Aramco shift from pricing against Dubai to pricing against ICE Brent futures (as in Europe) and raised questions about potential improvements to pricing methodology.

Freight

Tanker markets experienced extreme volatility in March, with rates across vessel classes reaching levels not seen since the pandemic-related dislocations of 2020. The near-total suspension of vessel traffic through the Strait of Hormuz reshaped global trade routes and concentrated demand for tonnage in both the Atlantic Basin and the limited alternative loading points in the Mideast Gulf. Bunker fuel costs rose alongside surging crude prices, and bunkering operations at Fujairah – one of the world's primary marine fuel hubs – were severely disrupted following drone attacks on 3 March, with force majeure declarations issued by some bunker suppliers. These constraints reinforced freight cost increases across vessel segments and placed additional upward pressure on voyage economics.

VLCC rates from the Middle East Gulf to Asia surged by \$8.07/bbl m-o-m to average \$12.86/bbl – approximately 600% above the five-year average. Chartering activity within the Gulf itself was muted, as shipowners remained deeply reluctant to transit the Strait of Hormuz in the face of missile and drone threats and extremely costly war risk coverage offered by major P&I reinsurers. From 25 March onwards, rates stabilised at around \$11/bbl, slightly below the \$14.90/bbl early March peak, as available tonnage pivoted to alternative loading points. Approximately 9% of the global VLCC fleet was effectively stranded within the Mideast Gulf at peak disruption, while a further large proportion remained on the water in the Gulf of Oman, waiting for the backlog on both sides of the chokepoint to clear. VLCC strength bled over into other tanker segments. Suezmax rates on key

Atlantic Basin routes – West Africa to UK Continent and US Gulf Coast to Europe – nearly doubled, rising approximately \$4/bbl m-o-m to average \$7.56/bbl and \$8.51/bbl, respectively, boosted by European refiners seeking alternatives to Mideast Gulf supplies. North Sea Aframax rates rose by \$0.92/bbl m-o-m to an average \$3.00/bbl.



Product tanker markets were similarly disrupted, with divergent trends across routes reflecting the competing impacts from collapsed Mideast Gulf exports and intensifying European demand for non-Middle Eastern product supply. Long Range (LR) rates on the Middle East Gulf-Japan route surged by \$5.25/bbl m-o-m to average \$10.95/bbl, as buyers of clean product from the Middle East shifted chartering to alternative sources following the loss of Hormuz flows. Force majeure declarations from refiners that lost Middle East crude aggravated tensions. The structural attractiveness of westbound repositioning for vessel owners created a sustained East-West freight spread differential that reflected the divergent supply situations facing European and Asian buyers. Medium Range (MR) rate dynamics tracked the market trend that reflected the hemispheric divergence. Rates peaked at an all-time high on 26 March. Singapore-Japan MR rates rose by a modest \$0.77/bbl m-o-m to \$3.68/bbl with rates on this route compressed relative to Atlantic Basin equivalents as weak regional availabilities due to export constraints capped values. Caribbean-US Atlantic MR rates rose by \$2.27/bbl to \$5.42/bbl, sustained by persistent European demand for non-Mideast product and limited vessel availability. UK-US Atlantic MR rates rose with the regional trend gaining \$2.37/bbl to \$5.47/bbl.

Freight Costs											
(monthly and weekly averages, \$/bbl)											
	Mar-26					Week Commencing					
	Jan 26	Feb 26	Mar 26	m-o-m Δ	y-o-y Δ	02-Mar	09-Mar	16-Mar	23-Mar	30-Mar	06-Apr
Crude Tankers											
VLCC MEG-Asia	2.91	4.79	12.86	8.07	10.94	13.95	12.52	13.71	11.86	11.33	11.33
130Kt WAF - UKC	3.66	4.06	7.56	3.50	5.18	7.60	6.64	6.34	8.91	8.82	8.14
130Kt USGC to EUR	3.89	4.16	8.51	4.36	6.02	7.42	7.78	7.30	10.84	9.98	9.10
North Sea Aframax	1.87	2.08	3.00	0.92	1.85	2.35	2.39	2.50	4.20	4.37	4.17
Product Tankers											
LR MEG - Japan	6.06	5.70	10.95	5.25	6.12	10.77	9.69	10.77	12.47	12.03	14.42
MR Sing - JPN	3.21	2.91	3.68	0.77	0.61	3.35	3.45	3.49	4.24	4.14	4.12
MR Carib - US Atlantic	2.23	3.14	5.42	2.27	3.22	4.58	4.90	5.50	6.52	5.95	6.71
MR UK-US Atlantic	2.71	3.10	5.47	2.37	1.71	4.78	5.22	5.13	6.37	6.52	6.89

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Tables

Table 1
WORLD OIL SUPPLY AND DEMAND
(million barrels per day)

	2022	2023	1Q24	2Q24	3Q24	4Q24	2024	1Q25	2Q25	3Q25	4Q25	2025	1Q26	2Q26	3Q26	4Q26	2026
OECD DEMAND																	
Americas	24.8	25.1	24.6	25.3	25.6	25.5	25.2	25.0	25.2	25.9	25.5	25.4	25.2	25.0	25.7	25.5	25.4
Europe	13.6	13.4	12.8	13.6	14.0	13.5	13.5	12.9	13.7	13.7	13.4	13.4	12.9	13.5	13.8	13.4	13.4
Asia Oceania	7.3	7.2	7.5	7.0	6.9	7.4	7.2	7.3	6.8	6.9	7.2	7.0	7.2	6.5	6.8	7.2	6.9
Total OECD	45.7	45.7	44.9	45.8	46.5	46.4	45.9	45.3	45.7	46.5	46.1	45.9	45.3	44.9	46.3	46.1	45.7
NON-OECD DEMAND																	
Eurasia	4.8	4.8	4.8	4.8	4.8	4.9	4.8	4.8	4.8	4.9	4.9	4.8	4.8	4.7	4.8	5.0	4.8
Europe	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.9	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.9	0.9	0.9
China	15.5	16.7	16.6	16.7	16.9	16.7	16.7	16.7	16.5	17.1	17.4	17.0	16.9	16.4	17.2	17.5	17.0
Other Asia	14.1	14.5	15.0	15.0	14.5	15.4	15.0	15.3	15.3	14.9	15.6	15.3	15.6	15.2	15.1	15.9	15.4
Latin America	6.3	6.4	6.3	6.4	6.6	6.5	6.5	6.4	6.5	6.7	6.7	6.6	6.5	6.6	6.8	6.8	6.6
Middle East	9.1	9.2	8.9	9.2	9.7	9.1	9.2	8.8	9.3	9.7	9.1	9.2	8.7	8.6	9.5	9.0	9.0
Africa	4.4	4.5	4.5	4.5	4.6	4.7	4.5	4.7	4.7	4.7	4.8	4.7	4.8	4.8	4.8	4.9	4.8
Total Non-OECD	54.8	56.9	56.8	57.4	57.9	58.2	57.6	57.6	57.9	58.9	59.4	58.5	58.1	57.2	59.2	60.0	58.6
Total Demand¹	100.5	102.6	101.7	103.3	104.4	104.6	103.5	102.9	103.6	105.4	105.4	104.3	103.4	102.1	105.5	106.0	104.3
OECD SUPPLY																	
Americas	25.8	27.5	27.7	28.4	28.5	29.2	28.5	28.6	28.9	29.9	30.1	29.4	29.4	29.9	30.1	30.1	29.9
Europe	3.2	3.2	3.3	3.2	3.1	3.2	3.2	3.3	3.2	3.3	3.4	3.3	3.5	3.5	3.4	3.4	3.4
Asia Oceania	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.4	0.5	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4
Total OECD²	29.5	31.2	31.5	32.0	32.1	32.8	32.1	32.3	32.6	33.6	33.9	33.1	33.3	33.7	34.0	34.0	33.7
NON-OECD SUPPLY																	
Eurasia	13.9	13.8	13.7	13.5	13.4	13.3	13.5	13.5	13.7	13.7	13.5	13.6	13.1	13.4	13.6	13.7	13.5
Europe	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1
China	4.2	4.3	4.4	4.4	4.3	4.3	4.3	4.5	4.5	4.4	4.3	4.4	4.5	4.4	4.4	4.4	4.4
Other Asia	2.7	2.6	2.6	2.6	2.6	2.6	2.6	2.6	2.6	2.6	2.6	2.6	2.5	2.6	2.6	2.6	2.6
Latin America	5.7	6.2	6.5	6.4	6.4	6.5	6.5	6.6	6.8	7.1	7.4	7.0	7.6	7.6	7.7	7.8	7.7
Middle East	3.1	3.1	3.0	3.1	3.1	3.1	3.1	3.1	3.1	3.1	3.1	3.1	2.6	1.7	2.7	2.8	2.4
Africa	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.4	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.4	2.4	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.4	2.4	2.5	2.5	2.5
Total Non-OECD²	32.2	32.7	32.9	32.5	32.3	32.3	32.5	32.9	33.1	33.4	33.5	33.2	32.8	32.2	33.6	33.9	33.1
Processing Gains ³	2.3	2.4	2.3	2.4	2.4	2.4	2.4	2.4	2.4	2.5	2.4	2.4	2.4	2.3	2.5	2.4	2.4
Global Biofuels	2.8	3.1	2.8	3.4	3.7	3.3	3.3	2.9	3.4	3.7	3.4	3.4	3.1	3.6	3.9	3.5	3.5
Total Non-OPEC	66.8	69.3	69.5	70.4	70.5	70.8	70.3	70.4	71.5	73.3	73.3	72.1	71.6	71.9	73.9	73.8	72.8
OPEC																	
Crude	27.7	27.4	27.3	27.2	27.2	27.3	27.2	27.5	28.2	29.0	29.0	28.4	26.7				
NGLs	5.4	5.5	5.5	5.5	5.5	5.5	5.5	5.5	5.6	5.7	5.7	5.6	5.3	4.1	5.4	5.5	5.1
Total OPEC⁴	33.1	32.9	32.8	32.8	32.7	32.8	32.8	33.0	33.8	34.7	34.7	34.1	32.0				
Total Supply	99.9	102.3	102.3	103.1	103.2	103.6	103.1	103.4	105.3	108.0	108.0	106.2	103.6				
STOCK CHANGES AND MISCELLANEOUS																	
Reported OECD																	
Industry	0.4	0.0	-0.1	0.8	-0.4	-0.6	-0.1	-0.1	0.4	0.9	-0.5	0.2					
Government	-0.7	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.0					
Total	-0.4	0.0	0.1	0.9	-0.3	-0.5	0.0	-0.1	0.4	0.8	-0.3	0.2					
Floating Storage/Oil in Transit	0.3	-0.1	0.9	-1.3	-0.6	0.0	-0.2	0.8	0.0	1.0	1.0	0.7					
Miscellaneous to balance ⁵	-0.5	-0.2	-0.4	0.3	-0.3	-0.5	-0.2	-0.2	1.4	0.8	2.0	1.0					
Total Stock Ch. & Misc	-0.6	-0.4	0.6	-0.1	-1.2	-1.0	-0.4	0.5	1.7	2.6	2.6	1.9					
Memo items:																	
Call on OPEC crude + Stock ch. ⁶	28.3	27.8	26.7	27.4	28.3	28.2	27.7	27.0	26.5	26.4	26.4	26.6	26.5	26.1	26.1	26.7	26.4

¹ Measured as deliveries from refineries and primary stocks, comprises inland deliveries, international marine bunkers, refinery fuel, crude for direct burning, oil from non-conventional sources and other sources of supply. Includes biofuels.

² Comprises crude oil, condensates, NGLs, oil from non-conventional sources and other sources of supply.

³ Net volumetric gains and losses in the refining process and marine transportation losses.

⁴ OPEC includes current members throughout the time series.

⁵ Includes changes in non-reported stocks in OECD and non-OECD.

⁶ Total demand minus total non-OPEC supply minus OPEC NGLs.

For the purpose of this and the following tables:

- OECD comprises of Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Czechia, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, Norway, New Zealand, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Republic of Türkiye, UK, US.

- OPEC is comprised of Algeria, Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, UAE and Venezuela. Neutral Zone production is included in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait production with their respective shares.

- OPEC+ comprises of OPEC members throughout time series plus Sudan, South Sudan, Russia, Oman, Mexico, Malaysia, Kazakhstan, Brunei, Bahrain, Azerbaijan.

Table 1a
WORLD OIL SUPPLY AND DEMAND: CHANGES FROM LAST MONTH'S TABLE 1
(million barrels per day)

	2022	2023	1Q24	2Q24	3Q24	4Q24	2024	1Q25	2Q25	3Q25	4Q25	2025	1Q26	2Q26	3Q26	4Q26	2026
OECD DEMAND																	
Americas	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	-0.3	-0.2	-0.1	-0.1
Europe	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	-0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0
Asia Oceania	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	-0.2	-0.2	0.0	0.0	-0.1
Total OECD	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	-0.1	-0.6	-0.1	0.0	-0.2
NON-OECD DEMAND																	
Eurasia	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Europe	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
China	0.3	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	-0.4	0.1	0.1	0.0
Other Asia	0.0	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.1	-0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1
Latin America	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Middle East	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	-0.7	-0.2	-0.1	-0.2
Africa	-0.1	-0.1	-0.1	-0.1	-0.1	-0.1	-0.1	-0.1	-0.1	-0.1	-0.1	-0.1	-0.1	-0.1	-0.1	-0.1	-0.1
Total Non-OECD	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.1	-1.3	-0.1	0.0	-0.3
Total Demand	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.2	0.1	-1.9	-0.2	0.0	-0.5
OECD SUPPLY																	
Americas	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.3	0.2	0.2
Europe	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	-0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0
Asia Oceania	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Total OECD	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.3	0.2	0.1
NON-OECD SUPPLY																	
Eurasia	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	-0.3	0.0	0.0	-0.1
Europe	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
China	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Other Asia	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Latin America	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1
Middle East	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	-1.1	-0.5	-0.3	-0.5
Africa	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Total Non-OECD	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	-1.4	-0.4	-0.2	-0.5
Processing Gains	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	-0.1	0.0	0.0	-0.1
Global Biofuels	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Total Non-OPEC	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.1	-1.4	-0.1	-0.1	-0.4
OPEC																	
Crude	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
NGLs	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	-0.1	-1.3	-0.4	-0.3	-0.5
Total OPEC	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.0					
Total Supply	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1					
STOCK CHANGES AND MISCELLANEOUS																	
Reported OECD																	
Industry	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	-0.1	0.0					
Government	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0					
Total	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	-0.1	0.0					
Floating Storage/Oil in Transit	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	-0.1	0.0				
Miscellaneous to balance	-0.1	-0.2	-0.2	-0.2	-0.2	-0.1	-0.2	-0.2	-0.1	-0.1	0.0	-0.1					
Total Stock Ch. & Misc	-0.1	-0.2	-0.2	-0.2	-0.2	-0.1	-0.2	-0.2	-0.1	-0.1	-0.2	-0.1					
Memo items:																	
Call on OPEC crude + Stock ch.	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.9	0.3	0.4	0.4

Note: When submitting monthly oil statistics, OECD member countries may update data for prior periods. Similar updates to non-OECD data can also occur.

Table 1b
WORLD OIL PRODUCTION (OPEC+ crude production based on current agreement ¹)
(million barrels per day)

	1Q24	2Q24	3Q24	4Q24	2024	1Q25	2Q25	3Q25	4Q25	2025	1Q26	2Q26	3Q26	4Q26	2026
Total Demand	101.7	103.3	104.4	104.6	103.5	102.9	103.6	105.4	105.4	104.3	103.4	102.1	105.5	106.0	104.3
OECD SUPPLY															
Americas ²	25.7	26.4	26.5	27.3	26.5	26.8	27.1	28.1	28.3	27.6	27.6	28.1	28.4	28.4	28.1
Europe	3.3	3.2	3.1	3.2	3.2	3.3	3.2	3.3	3.4	3.3	3.5	3.5	3.4	3.4	3.4
Asia Oceania	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.4	0.5	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4
Total OECD (non-OPEC+)	29.4	30.1	30.1	30.9	30.1	30.5	30.8	31.8	32.1	31.3	31.5	32.0	32.2	32.3	32.0
NON-OECD SUPPLY															
Eurasia ³	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3
Europe	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1
China	4.4	4.4	4.3	4.3	4.3	4.5	4.5	4.4	4.3	4.4	4.5	4.4	4.4	4.4	4.4
Other Asia ⁴	2.0	2.0	1.9	2.0	2.0	1.9	1.9	1.9	2.0	1.9	1.9	1.9	1.9	1.9	1.9
Latin America	6.5	6.4	6.4	6.5	6.5	6.6	6.8	7.1	7.4	7.0	7.6	7.6	7.7	7.8	7.7
Middle East ⁵	1.9	1.9	1.9	1.9	1.9	1.9	1.9	1.9	1.9	1.9	1.4	0.6	1.4	1.6	1.2
Africa ⁶	2.3	2.3	2.4	2.4	2.4	2.3	2.3	2.3	2.3	2.3	2.3	2.3	2.3	2.4	2.3
Total Non-OECD (non-OPEC+)	17.5	17.4	17.3	17.4	17.4	17.7	17.8	18.1	18.4	18.0	18.1	17.2	18.2	18.4	18.0
Processing Gains	2.3	2.4	2.4	2.4	2.4	2.4	2.4	2.5	2.4	2.4	2.4	2.3	2.5	2.4	2.4
Global Biofuels	2.8	3.4	3.7	3.3	3.3	2.9	3.4	3.7	3.4	3.4	3.1	3.6	3.9	3.5	3.5
Total Non-OPEC+	52.1	53.2	53.5	54.0	53.2	53.4	54.4	56.1	56.3	55.1	55.0	55.1	56.8	56.7	55.9
OPEC+ CRUDE															
Algeria	0.9	0.9	0.9	0.9	0.9	0.9	0.9	0.9	0.9	0.9	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0
Azerbaijan	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5
Bahrain	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.1	0.0	0.2	0.2	0.1
Brunei	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1
Congo	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3
Equatorial Guinea	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Gabon	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2
Iran	3.3	3.3	3.4	3.4	3.3	3.2	3.3	3.3	3.5	3.3	3.6	3.4	3.4	3.4	3.4
Iraq	4.3	4.3	4.3	4.3	4.3	4.3	4.3	4.6	4.5	4.4	3.5	2.0	3.6	4.2	3.3
Kazakhstan	1.6	1.6	1.6	1.4	1.6	1.8	1.8	1.9	1.6	1.8	1.6	1.9	1.8	1.8	1.8
Kuwait	2.5	2.6	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.7	2.7	2.7	2.6	2.7	2.1	1.2	2.3	2.6	2.1
Libya	1.1	1.2	0.9	1.1	1.1	1.2	1.3	1.3	1.2	1.3	1.3	1.3	1.3	1.3	1.3
Malaysia	0.4	0.4	0.3	0.3	0.4	0.4	0.3	0.4	0.3	0.3	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4
Mexico	1.6	1.6	1.6	1.5	1.6	1.4	1.4	1.4	1.4	1.4	1.4	1.4	1.4	1.3	1.4
Nigeria	1.3	1.3	1.3	1.4	1.3	1.5	1.5	1.4	1.4	1.4	1.4	1.4	1.4	1.4	1.4
Oman	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.8
Russia	9.4	9.3	9.2	9.3	9.3	9.1	9.3	9.2	9.3	9.2	9.0	9.0	9.3	9.3	9.1
Saudi Arabia	9.3	8.9	9.1	9.0	9.1	9.0	9.3	9.6	9.8	9.4	9.3	8.2	10.2	10.2	9.5
South Sudan	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1
Sudan	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
UAE	3.2	3.3	3.3	3.2	3.2	3.2	3.4	3.6	3.6	3.5	3.2	2.4	3.6	3.7	3.2
Venezuela	0.8	0.9	0.9	0.9	0.9	0.9	0.9	1.0	1.0	1.0	0.8	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0
OPEC+ Crude	41.9	41.7	41.4	41.4	41.6	41.8	42.7	43.6	43.4	42.9	40.6	36.6	43.0	43.9	41.1
OPEC+ NGLs & Condensate	8.2	8.1	8.1	8.1	8.1	8.0	8.2	8.2	8.2	8.1	7.9	6.7	7.9	8.1	7.6
OPEC+ Nonconventionals	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.1
Total OPEC+	50.2	49.9	49.7	49.6	49.9	50.0	51.0	51.9	51.7	51.2	48.5	43.3	51.0	52.1	48.8
Total Supply	102.3	103.1	103.2	103.6	103.1	103.4	105.3	108.0	108.0	106.2	103.6	98.4	107.8	108.8	104.7
Memo items:															
Call on OPEC+ crude & stock changes	41.3	41.8	42.6	42.3	42.0	41.3	41.0	41.0	40.8	41.0	40.5	40.2	40.7	41.2	40.6

¹ Libya and Iran held at most recent level through 2027.

² OECD Americas excludes Mexico.

³ Eurasia excludes Russia, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan.

⁴ Other Asia excludes Brunei, Malaysia.

⁵ Middle East excludes Oman, Bahrain.

⁶ Africa excludes Sudan, South Sudan.

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The following tables in this OMR are only available to subscribers:

Product Prices and Cracks (page 36), Prompt Month Oil Futures Prices (page 56), Spot Crude Oil Prices and Differentials (page 60), as well as the following numbered Tables from pages 66 to 91. Table 2: Summary of Global Oil Demand, Table 2a: OECD Regional Oil Demand, Table 2b: Oil Demand in Selected OECD Countries, Table 3: World Oil Production, Table 3a: Oil Supply in OECD Countries, Table 3b: World Oil Production (OPEC+ crude production based on current agreement), Table 4: OECD Stocks and Quarterly Stock Changes, Table 4a: Industry Stocks on Land in Selected Countries, Table 5: Total Stocks on Land in OECD Countries, Table 6: IEA Member Country Destinations of Selected Crude Streams, Table 7: Regional OECD Imports, Table 7a: Regional OCED Imports from Non-OECD Countries, Table 7b: Inter-Regional OECD Transfers, Table 8: Regional OECD Crude Imports by Source, Table 9: Regional OECD Gasoline Imports by Source; Table 10: Regional OECD Gasoil/Diesel Imports by Source, Table 11: Regional OECD Jet and Kerosene Imports by Source, Table 12: Regional OECD Residual Fuel Oil Imports by Source, Table 13: Average IEA CIF Crude Cost and Spot Crude and Product Prices, Table 14: Monthly Average End-User Prices for Petroleum Products, Table 15: IEA Global Indicator Refining Margins, Table 16: Refined Product Yields Based on Total Input, Table 17: World Biofuels Production, Table 18: Russian Oil Exports and Revenues, Table 18a: Russian Crude FOB Weighted Average Export Prices, Table 18b: Russian FOB Product Export Prices.

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For information on the data sources, definitions, technical terms and general approach used in preparing the Oil Market Report (OMR), Market Report Series_Oil and Annual Statistical Supplement (current issue of the Statistical Supplement dated 13 August 2025), readers are referred to the Users' Guide at <https://www.iea.org/articles/oil-market-report-glossary>. It should be noted that the spot crude and product price assessments are based on daily Argus prices, converted when appropriate to US\$ per barrel according to the Argus specification of products (source: 2026 Argus Media Group - all rights reserved).

